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Harrison: Public Rights, Private Privileges, and Article III

PUBLIC RIGHTS, PRIVATE PRIVILEGES,
AND ARTICLE III
John Harrison*
This Article addresses the constitutional justification
for adjudication by executive agencies that rests on the
presence of a public right. The public rights rationale
originated in the nineteenth century and was for many
decades the dominant explanation for the performance
of adjudicative functions by executive agencies. The U.S.
Supreme Court most recently relied on that rationale in
Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group in
2018. In light of the Court’s interest in the nineteenth
century system, this Article explores that system in depth
and seeks to identify the ways in which it authorizes and
limits executive adjudication.
The nineteenth century system focused on public
rights, private rights, and private privileges. Courts
protected the private rights they found in the primary
law, including federal statutes that created such rights.
Private privileges, unlike private rights, could be
affected by the unilateral exercise of a proprietary right
of the government—that is, by the exercise of a public
right. The interest in receiving a payment from the
Treasury was a classic example of a private privilege,
provided Congress had not given the private recipient a
judicially enforceable claim to it. When the Executive
Branch administered the government’s own legal
interests according to the law, it often performed a
function that resembled adjudication. That function was
nevertheless an exercise of executive power because
executive officials act for the government as proprietor
and contracting party. Executive adjudication thus was
permissible under the older system when Congress
James Madison Distinguished Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks to
participants at a workshop at the University of Virginia School of Law and to Caleb Nelson
for very helpful comments.
*
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created the relation of public right and private privilege.
Whether Congress may do so depends, like other
questions concerning congressional power, on the scope
of Congress’s enumerated powers. This Article identifies
the questions concerning congressional power that must
be answered in order to decide when Congress may
create the relations that underwrite executive
adjudication under the older system and shows that the
scope for that form of decision-making may be quite
broad. One constitutional rule is notably absent from the
list of constraints: the vesting of the judicial power in the
courts by Article III. The constitutional function of the
courts is to protect rights. Under the older system,
whether a private person has a right with respect to any
specific interest depends on the primary law, not Article
III. The judicial power took public rights, private rights,
and private privileges as it found them.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol54/iss1/5

2

Harrison: Public Rights, Private Privileges, and Article III

2019]

PUBLIC RIGHTS, PRIVATE PRIVILEGES

145

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... 147
II. THE COURT’S ARTICLE III CASES AND RENEWED INTEREST IN
PRIVATE RIGHTS ................................................................ 151
A. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN RECENT ARTICLE III CASES
..................................................................................... 151
B. AGENCY ADJUDICATION AND THE BROADER ARTICLE III
PROBLEM ...................................................................... 154
III. EXECUTIVE ADJUDICATION AS AN EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE
POWER ............................................................................... 157
A. EXECUTIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
SYSTEM ......................................................................... 157
B. PUBLIC RIGHTS, PRIVATE PRIVILEGES, AND EXECUTIVE
POWER .......................................................................... 160
1. Private Rights, Public Rights, and Private Privileges.
............................................................................... 160
2. Powers of Government and Public and Private
Interests.................................................................. 172
IV. THE POTENTIAL SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE ADJUDICATION ......... 179
A. CASES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS .......... 180
B. EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES BETWEEN PRIVATE
PARTIES ........................................................................ 183
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON EXECUTIVE ADJUDICATION
BASED ON PUBLIC RIGHTS AND PRIVATE PRIVILEGES ....... 188
A. INTERNAL LIMITS ON ENUMERATED POWERS .................. 188
1. Federalism and the Source of Private Rights.......... 189
2. Creating Relations of Public Right and Private
Privilege When an Enumerated Power Is Available....
............................................................................... 191
a. Powers to Grant Benefits. .................................. 192
b. Regulatory Powers, Prohibitions, and Licensing. ...
.......................................................................... 196
B. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND EXECUTIVE
ADJUDICATION .............................................................. 199

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

3

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 5

146

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:143

1. Limitations Protecting Freedom of Conduct and
Choice. .................................................................... 200
2. Constitutional Protections of Life, Natural Liberty, and
Property.................................................................. 201
a. Property.............................................................. 202
i. Private Property and Takings....................... 202
ii. Government Benefits and Requirements of
Judicial Review. ......................................... 204
b. Life and Natural Liberty. .................................. 207
C. ARTICLE III AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT ................................................................. 209

1. Rights to Judicial Hearings under Article III and
Unconstitutional Conditions. ................................ 210
2. Procedural Due Process and Executive Adjudication. ..
............................................................................... 211
VI. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE .. 213

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol54/iss1/5

4

Harrison: Public Rights, Private Privileges, and Article III

2019]

PUBLIC RIGHTS, PRIVATE PRIVILEGES

147

I. INTRODUCTION
Each of the Constitution’s first three articles begins by vesting
one of the great powers of government in a distinct institution or
officer.1 Legislative, executive, and judicial powers are separated. A
well-known constitutional difficulty arises because important
components of the government seem to combine the three. Federal
agencies whose heads are appointed and removable by the
President often have statutory authority to issue regulations that
have the force and effect of law and thereby perform a function
resembling that of Congress.2 Agencies are also often authorized to
make decisions in specific disputes that will receive significant
deference if they are challenged in court and thereby perform a
function that resembles that of the courts.3
In recent years, controversy has arisen again about executive
performance of legislative and adjudicative functions. Some of the
Justices have expressed considerable concern about so-called
non-Article III adjudication. Recent cases have brought to the
forefront a rubric under which the U.S. Supreme Court has often
addressed executive adjudication: the distinction between public
and private rights. In Oil States Energy Services, L.L.C. v. Greene’s
Energy Group, L.L.C.,4 the Court upheld a form of executive
adjudication on the ground that the interests involved were public
and not private rights.5 The Court spoke through Justice Thomas,
who has expressed serious skepticism about executive performance

1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting all legislative power granted in Congress); U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1 (vesting executive power in a President of the United States); U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1 (vesting the judicial power of the United States in one supreme court and such inferior
courts as Congress may establish).
2 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(applying regulation implementing the Clean Air Act adopted by the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency).
3 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (approving
adjudication by agency subject only to limited judicial review).
4 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
5 Oil States involved “inter partes review” of a patent by the Patent and Trademark
Office. Under that process, once a patent has been issued a non-patentee can petition the
Patent and Trademark Office for review and possible cancellation of the patent. Petitions can
lead to a proceeding before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, an adjudicatory body within
the Patent and Trademark Office composed of Administrative Law Judges. The petitioner
and the patent owner participate in adjudicatory proceedings before the board. Its decisions
are subject to review by the Federal Circuit, which decides legal issues de novo and affirms
factual findings that are based on substantial evidence. Id. at 1371–72.
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of adjudicatory functions and has discussed the public rights
rationale in earlier opinions in which he did not speak for a
majority.6
The principle that executive adjudication is permissible with
respect to public rights is not a new one. In his separate opinions,
Justice Thomas has relied on recent scholarship by Professor Caleb
Nelson that explores in depth an older way of understanding both
the distinction between public and private rights, and the legal
principles governing executive decision making that used it.7 That
understanding, as Nelson shows, was standard in the nineteenth
and earlier twentieth century and continues to influence the Court
through both its older cases and its ongoing attention to the
distinction between the two kinds of rights.
This Article further explores the older system that Nelson has
recovered and that apparently has considerable appeal for many
Justices today. The system’s central principle was that executive
officials could perform adjudicatory-type functions when they made
decisions with respect to public rights. Such decisions affected
private positions that were not rights but instead were privileges in
the old juxtaposition between the two. This Article’s central thesis
is an explanation for that principle: when acting with respect to
public rights and private privileges, executive officials were
performing the characteristic executive function of exercising the
government’s own proprietary rights. Although executive decisions
6 Dissenting in B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316
(2015), Justice Thomas wrote, “[b]ecause federal administrative agencies are part of the
Executive Branch, it is not clear that they have power to adjudicate claims involving core
private rights. Under our Constitution, the ‘judicial power’ belongs to Article III courts and
cannot be shared with the Legislature or the Executive.” Later in that Term of the Court, he
raised the same issue in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif: “Our precedents
reveal that the resolution of certain cases or controversies requires the exercise of [judicial]
power, but that others ‘may or may not’ be brought ‘within the cognizance of [Article III
courts], as [Congress] deem[s] proper.’” 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1963 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(first alteration added) (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)). Justice Thomas went on to explain, “[d]isposition of private
rights to life, liberty, and property falls within the core of the judicial power, whereas
disposition of public rights does not.” Id.
7 Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (2007).
In B & B Hardware, Justice Thomas, citing Nelson’s article, wrote, “[a]nd some historical
evidence suggests that the adjudication of core private rights is a function that can be
performed only by Article III courts, at least absent the consent of the parties to adjudication
in another forum.” 135 S. Ct. at 1316 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Nelson, supra, at 561–
74). He also cited Nelson in Wellness International, 135 S. Ct. at 1964 n.2 (citing Nelson,
supra note 7, at 575–76).
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as to private privileges had effects similar to those produced by
judicial proceedings, executive officials making such decisions were
exercising executive, not judicial, power. Judicial involvement in
those decisions was no more constitutionally required than is
judicial involvement in the decision whether to enter into a
government contract. Under the older system, the government’s
own proprietary interests gave it no control over private legal
interests that were rights and not privileges, so with respect to
those interests only courts could affect private parties through
genuine adjudication.
From that account of the older system flow two conclusions that
may be surprising. The first is that Congress’s power to provide for
executive adjudication under the older approach derives from, and
is as broad as, its ability to create the relation of public right and
private privilege. Congress may be able to do so in a wide range of
situations, so the older system may not constrain executive
adjudication as much as it may seem to. Whether Congress may do
so depends on the considerations that usually determine the scope
of congressional power: the internal limits of enumerated federal
power and the external constraints imposed by affirmative
limitations.
The second—and possibly surprising—conclusion is that the
courts’ exclusive possession of the judicial power was not a
constraint under the older system of executive adjudication. That
system did not rest on the principle that because courts possess the
judicial power, they must decide finally with respect to some legally
protected interests, whereas Congress may choose between
executive and judicial adjudication as to other legally protected
interests. Rather, the nineteenth century system assumed that
judicial power has the same relationship to all legally protected
interests. The important distinction was found in the executive
power. Because executive officials administer public rights—that is,
the proprietary interests of the government—they may affect
private interests that qualify as privileges without exercising
judicial power. The limits of executive adjudication were set by the
limits of Congress’s ability to establish the primary legal relation of
public right and private privilege. The older system did not assume
that the judicial power has a core defined by certain interests and a
periphery defined by other interests that might or might not be
brought within judicial cognizance. The judicial power operated
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with respect to rights, and the question of whether an interest was
protected by a right, or was instead a privilege, depended on the
primary law.
Part II of this Article discusses the Court’s recent encounters
with adjudication by executive agencies, the appearance in the cases
of the distinction between public and private rights, and the
renewed interest in the older understanding of those concepts by
some of the Justices today. It also distinguishes the specific problem
of adjudicatory decisions by executive officials from other parts of
the larger problem of so-called non-Article III tribunals, a category
that includes the courts of the federal territories and the District of
Columbia.
Part III addresses the older system of executive adjudication that
turned on the difference between private rights and private
privileges. It describes that system and then provides an
explanation of it that results from the interaction of the distinction
between private rights and privileges on one side, and between
executive and judicial power on the other. A private privilege was a
private interest that could be affected by an operation of the
proprietary-type rights of the government. Because the actual
exercise of the government’s proprietary rights is in the hands of
executive officials, executive power may exercise public rights and
affect private privileges. Because courts enforce rights but do not
protect privileges, which by definition are interests that may be
affected by someone else without the consent of the party whose only
claim is a privilege, courts have no role with respect to privileges.
Under the older system, Congress could give the courts any role it
chose regarding public benefits by creating rights against the
government that run to private people, but it had complete
discretion in doing so.
In light of the rationale for the older system of executive
adjudication, Part IV shows how it can give rise to that form of
adjudication in a range of situations, including, as in Oil States,
situations that involve disputes between private parties. Part V
then identifies categories of constitutional constraint on Congress’s
ability to provide for executive adjudication using the rationale that
rests on public rights and private privileges. As is generally true
with respect to powers of Congress, those constraints are found in
both the internal limits on enumerated power and the external
limits imposed by affirmative restrictions. Article III’s allocation of
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the judicial power exclusively to the courts, I argue, is not a
constraint in this connection.
Part VI notes the possibility that a return to the older system, in
which executive adjudication depended on relations of public right
and private privilege, might not constrain administrative
government as much as some of its advocates may think. I argue
that the limited constraining effect of structural norms often results
from their trans-substantive character, which is one of their basic
features.
II. THE COURT’S ARTICLE III CASES AND RENEWED INTEREST IN
PRIVATE RIGHTS
A. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN RECENT ARTICLE III CASES

For many decades the U.S. Supreme Court has grappled with the
constitutional issues that arise when a federal institution other
than an Article III court makes a decision based on the application
of law to fact, where that institution’s conclusion will not be subject
to de novo consideration in an Article III tribunal.8 The Court under
Chief Justice Marshall discussed the status of the courts of the
federal territories, which functioned much like state courts but
many of which did not have life-tenured judges.9 The problem of
adjudication outside the Article III courts continued to come before
the Court.10
In 1982, in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,11
the Court considered the constitutionality of the bankruptcy courts
that Congress had established in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978. The judges of those courts did not serve for life, and the courts
were authorized to decide a wide range of issues subject to only
limited review by Article III courts.12 Northern Pipeline involved a
8 By an Article III court or tribunal, I mean a case-deciding institution staffed exclusively
by life-tenured judges appointed pursuant to Article III of the Constitution that uses juries
when required to do so.
9 Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828) (noting authority of Florida
territorial court).
10 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 85–86 (1932) (discussing adjudication before
the U.S. Employment Commission).
11 458 U.S. 50 (1982), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, as recognized in Wellness
International, 135 S. Ct. at 1939.
12 Id. at 53–55.
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claim under state law, not a question of federal bankruptcy law.
Northern Pipeline had filed for bankruptcy reorganization and, as
allowed by the Bankruptcy Act, brought a proceeding in the
bankruptcy court against Marathon Pipe Line, seeking damages for
breach of contract, warranty, misrepresentation, coercion, and
duress.13 The Court concluded that Article III barred that
jurisdiction but produced no opinion for the majority.
Speaking for four of the Justices in the majority, Justice Brennan
sought to find the pattern in the Court’s precedents. The United
States, as amicus curiae in support of the Act’s constitutionality,
had argued that under the Court’s cases, “pursuant to its
enumerated Article I powers, Congress may establish legislative
courts that have jurisdiction to decide cases to which the Article III
judicial power of the United States extends.”14 According to the
Solicitor General, that power included specialized areas such as
bankruptcy law.15 Justice Brennan responded that “when properly
understood, these precedents [relied on by the Solicitor General]
represent no broad departure from the constitutional command that
the judicial power of the United States must be vested in Art. III
courts.”16 Instead, “they reduce to three narrow situations not
subject to that command, each recognizing a circumstance in which
the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive Branches was
historically and constitutionally so exceptional that the [assertion
of congressional power] was consistent with, rather than
threatening to, the constitutional mandate of separation of
powers.”17 Two of those narrow, exceptional situations involved
territorial courts and courts-martial.18 The third, and the subject of
current controversy and this Article, were cases “in which [the]
Court has upheld the constitutionality of legislative courts and
administrative agencies created by Congress to adjudicate cases
involving ‘public rights.’”19

13 Id. at 56. As Justice Brennan pointed out, Marathon Pipe Line asserted state-created
private rights. Id. at 71.
14 Id. at 62 (quoting Brief for the United States at 9, N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50 (Nos. 81-150,
81-546), 1982 WL 607231, at *9).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 63–64.
17 Id. at 64.
18 Id. at 64–66.
19 Id. at 67.
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The historical practice underlying the Court’s concept of public
rights adjudication was the subject of a major study published by
Professor Caleb Nelson in 2007.20 As he explained, under nineteenth
and early twentieth century doctrine, executive officials could make
decisions based on the application of law to fact that would be
subject to limited or no review in Article III courts when the legal
interests at stake fell into certain categories.21 As recounted in more
detail below, Nelson found that executive adjudication was
permissible with respect to public benefits and so-called public
franchises, like corporate charters, but not with respect to what he
calls “core private rights.”22 Ordinary private interests based on
property and contract were leading examples of core private rights.
The Court recently has again noted the distinction between
public and private rights in discussing its cases that rely on the
presence of the former. Writing for the Court in Stern v. Marshall,23
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that its decisions have “contrasted cases
within the reach of the public rights exception” with those involving
matters of private right.24 In Oil States, the Court, through Justice
Thomas, explained that “[w]hen determining whether a proceeding
involves an exercise of Article III judicial power, this Court’s
precedents have distinguished between ‘public rights’ and ‘private
rights.’”25 He found that the inter partes review of patents at issue
in that case “falls squarely within the public-rights doctrine.”26
Justice Breyer concurred, adding that in his view the Constitution
makes the presence of a public right a sufficient but not necessary
condition for agency adjudication that is subject to only limited
judicial review.27 Justice Gorsuch dissented: he rejected the
Nelson, supra note 7.
Id. at 563–64 (highlighting that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized “precedents
allowing legislatures or their delegates in the executive branch to adjudicate ‘public rights’”).
22 Id. at 566–68 (discussing the development of the distinction between public and private
rights in nineteenth century practice based on how American lawyers viewed different legal
interests).
23 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
24 Id. at 489.
25 Oil States Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., L.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373
(2018) (citing Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 32 (2014)).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1379 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The conclusion that inter partes review is a matter
involving public rights is sufficient to show that it violates neither Article III nor the Seventh
Amendment. But the Court’s opinion should not be read to say that matters involving private
rights may never be adjudicated other than by Article III courts, say, sometimes by
agencies.”).
20
21
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argument that patents are “a species of public franchises” and
therefore subject to cancellation by the executive.28 Public
franchises are one of the categories of public as opposed to private
rights that Professor Nelson finds in nineteenth century practice.29
B. AGENCY ADJUDICATION AND THE BROADER ARTICLE III PROBLEM

This Article concerns a problem often referred to as non-Article
III adjudication. This problem arises in many contexts, and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s cases have generated a welter of concepts and
terminology. The specific piece of that problem examined here is
what is sometimes called agency adjudication involving public
rights.
This Article is not about institutions and officers like bankruptcy
courts. Bankruptcy judges are examples of decision makers who
may usefully be said to be within the judicial branch but who are
neither life-tenured judges nor juries. Bankruptcy courts are
denominated by statute as units of the federal district courts.30
Their judges are appointed by the courts of appeals31 and may be
removed by the Circuit Councils of their circuits.32 Their decisions
are reviewed by courts staffed by life-tenured judges.33 Bankruptcy
judges are subordinate officers within the court system.
Constitutional questions concerning their permissible authority
thus are like those concerning the functions that may be assigned
to the clerks of the federal courts, or the relations between judges
and juries.
This Article is also not about the courts of the territories or the
District of Columbia. The territories and the District have
general-purpose governments that function almost identically to
those of the states, and those governments have courts as the states
do.34 A recurring question about the constitutional system is

Id. at 1385 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
See Nelson, supra note 7, at 567 (explaining how public franchises were seen as public
rights by Anglo-American lawyers in nineteenth century practice).
30 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (describing how bankruptcy courts are designated).
31 Id. § 152(a) (detailing appointment).
32 Id. § 152(e) (describing removal).
33 Id. § 158 (providing that district court judges may hear appeals from bankruptcy courts).
34 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64–65 (1982)
(discussing earlier opinions approving non-Article III courts in federal territories and the
District), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
28
29
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whether and how the three-way division of federal power created by
Articles I, II, and III operates in the territories and the District.35
Territorial and D.C. courts are part of that larger problem. The
judges of the D.C. Court of Appeals do not serve with life tenure and
that is a constitutional problem.36 The Mayor of the District is not
appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause.37 The D.C. City
Council is not Congress.38 Those are constitutional problems too—
and of the same kind. They are about federal power generally, not
about Article III specifically.
Nor will I address the constitutional status of courts martial and
military commissions. That courts martial are consistent with the
Constitution is clear; the Fifth Amendment refers to cases in the
land and naval forces, thereby alluding to the courts martial that
try them.39 Why the Constitution allows them is another question—
one I will not try to resolve. Military commissions are less clearly
contemplated by the Constitution, though the U.S. Supreme Court
has accepted them in certain circumstances.40 I will not explore
whether those decisions are correct.
This Article does not address the entire problem of non-Article
III adjudication, but it does have an important implication for one
standard way of formulating that problem as a whole. The rationale
for executive adjudication with respect to public rights and private
privileges does not much resemble the rationale for the courts of the
territories and the District. In the older system of executive
adjudication, executive officials performed a function resembling

Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, as recognized in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135
S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
35 See Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L.
REV. 853, 856–58 (1990) (examining the three-way division of federal power in the context of
territorial governance and highlighting the recurrence of constitutional questions brought
forth in territories).
36 See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973) (holding that D.C. courts may
impose criminal punishment although not staffed by life-tenured judges).
37 See Act of Dec. 24, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774, § 421 (providing for the
election of the D.C. Mayor).
38 See id. § 401 (providing for the election of the D.C. City Council).
39 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that a grand jury is not required “in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger”). The leading early case finding courts martial constitutional is Dynes v. Hoover, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
40 See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 2 (1942) (holding that military commission sitting
in the United States may impose sentence of death on members of the enemy military
convicted of spying).
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that of the courts but did so by exercising public rights. Courts do
not exercise public rights: they do not act on behalf of the
government as owner, for example, by dispensing the government’s
funds as an owner would. When courts give judgment against the
government requiring a money payment, they act as they would
with respect to a private party. An agency decision concerning
public rights is not federal adjudication outside of the Article III
courts the way a decision by the D.C. superior court is.41

41 As explained in more depth below, when courts accept an executive exercise of a public
right, they do not thereby defer to executive fact-finding or law-identification the way an
appellate court defers to a lower court’s findings of fact. The justification for executive
adjudication that I will explore is not based on the claim that executive officers can be final
as to law or fact the way one court can be final relative to a later court. There are at least two
rationales in support of limited judicial review of executive decisions that can reasonably be
characterized as deference by the courts. One involves rules of evidence. Congress might
enact, or a court might adopt, a principle that courts should use an evidentiary presumption
that agency decision makers were correct in their findings of fact. Whether such evidentiary
principles are consistent with the courts’ constitutional role, I will not address. Second,
genuine non-judicial finality as to fact and law is found in the U.S. Supreme Court’s political
question doctrine. As that doctrine reflects, sometimes the U.S. Constitution confers on some
non-judicial actor the authority conclusively to apply law to fact. The leading examples are
the Senate’s role as judge of impeachments and each House of Congress’s role as judge of the
elections of its own members. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993) (holding
that the Senate’s decision in an impeachment trial is binding on the courts); Roudebush v.
Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19 (1972) (explaining that the Senate’s decision regarding a contested
election is “unconditional and final”). Those grants of adjudicatory power are readily seen as
limited exceptions to the exclusive vesting of judicial power in the Article III courts. In other
situations, the U.S. Supreme Court has found that a political decision maker’s application of
law to fact is entitled to absolute deference by the judiciary. Recognition of states and their
governments is the leading example. See, e.g., Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S.
118, 147 (1912) (noting that Congress’s conclusion that a state’s government is republican
and lawful is absolutely binding on the courts). That aspect of the political question doctrine
can be justified as a resolution of a difficulty that arises when law and political judgment, the
usual grounds of decision of the courts and the political branches, are inextricably
intertwined. When the President decides whether some foreign entity is a state, for example,
he applies law to fact and at the same time makes policy judgments; political questions are
political, not in the sense of being partisan, but in the sense of resting on normative principles
about public authority. Law and politics are both involved and are inseparable in recognition
decisions, and if the President encroaches on the judicial power in making such a decision,
the courts would encroach on the executive power in doing so. Often a reasonable solution to
that problem is to recognize that the two kinds of judgments (legal and political) are
inseparable and that keeping the courts from making the political judgment is very
important. Under those circumstances, a principle of absolute deference by the courts when
the issue comes before them is called for. That principle may derive from the U.S.
Constitution itself or from non-constitutional law. See John Harrison, The Political Question
Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 505–09 (2017) (reasoning that inability to separate legal
and political judgments supports parts of the political question doctrine).
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III. EXECUTIVE ADJUDICATION AS AN EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE
POWER
This Part provides an explanation of the nineteenth century
system of executive adjudication that Professor Nelson has
recovered and that recently has drawn interest from several
Justices. I first describe that system in Section A. Then, in Section
B, I derive the system from the interaction between different kinds
of interests and the different powers of government. The kinds of
interests are public rights, private privileges, and private rights.
The powers of government are executive and judicial. As I will
explain, executive adjudication was constitutionally permissible
because the exercise of public rights to affect private privileges was
within the executive and not the judicial power, just as making a
contract on behalf of the government is an executive and not a
judicial act. Public rights are the proprietary rights of the
government. Private privileges are private interests that are not
themselves rights and that are liable to be affected by an exercise of
a public right; the interest in a gratuitous payment from the
Treasury is a classic example of a private privilege. Finally, Section
C discusses the ways in which Congress can provide for executive
adjudication by creating the relation of public right and private
privilege between the government and private people.
A. EXECUTIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY SYSTEM

The older system of executive adjudication rested on a few basic
principles. Before seeking their legal foundations, I will briefly
describe them.
The first principle is that Congress had very broad discretion in
deciding whether to grant certain benefits to private people. It could
decide whether to grant veterans’ pensions that were not required
by contract, and it could decide whether to award franchises, such
as permission to operate a bridge over a navigable river.42 If
42 As Nelson explains, “[c]ourts certainly did not have to be involved for legislatures to
authorize the expenditure of money from the public treasury or the disposition of other forms
of public property administered by the government.” Nelson, supra note 7, at 570. The same
was true with respect to franchises and permissions to engage in some activity: “If the
appropriate legislative body so desired, it could authoritatively permit private companies to
construct bridges or dams that would hinder or even completely defeat navigation along
particular rivers.” Id.
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Congress decided not to grant a benefit, any disappointed seeker
thereof had no judicial recourse against that decision.43
Next, rather than granting benefits directly by statute, Congress
could adopt general rules according to which executive officials
would dispense them. Those rules could give the implementing
officials substantial discretion or none at all.44 When executive
discretion was substantially limited, implementing officials
performed a function that was quite similar to that of courts and
that reasonably could be called executive adjudication. In those
circumstances, the executive applied general rules to particular
factual situations and acted as the rule required in that situation.45
Like a court, an official often would implement a legal conclusion
with an act that changed the legal position of a private person—for
example, by transferring public lands to a new, private owner.46
When Congress set out rules by which executive officials were to
dispense benefits, it could decide on the extent of judicial
involvement.47 It might leave private beneficiaries of the law with
no judicial recourse at all; it also might provide for what today would

43 Id. at 569–70 (noting that only courts could affect private rights but Congress by itself
could decide on the disposition of public rights such as Treasury funds).
44 In 1794, for example, Congress directed the Secretary of War to place on the invalid
pension list those persons he found clearly within the provisions of an earlier act regarding
pensions. Act of June 7, 1794, ch. 52, 1 Stat. 392, 392–93. That Act called for the application
of law to fact with no policy discretion. Id. A few years earlier, Congress authorized the
President to set the compensation of excise officials at amounts he deemed “reasonable and
proper,” provided his decisions were within a specified range. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 58,
1 Stat. 199, 213 (authorizing the President, up to stated limits, “to make such allowances to
the said supervisors, inspectors, and to the deputies and officers by them to be appointed and
employed for their respective services in the execution of this act, to be paid out of the product
of the said duties, as he shall deem reasonable and proper”).
45 Courts in the nineteenth century understood that executive officials dispensing private
privileges could be exercising an adjudicative function by applying law to fact although they
did not exercise the Article III judicial power. See, e.g., Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636,
640–41 (1881) (noting that land office exercises a “judicial function” and is part of the
administrative and Executive Branch of the government).
46 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 577–78 (describing conclusive application of statutory rules
to particular private claims by federal land office officials). As Nelson stresses, Congress’s
discretion concerning benefits did not carry over to executive officials who had to carry out
the law: “Even where core private rights were not at stake, of course, executive officials had
to respect statutory privileges that had been granted to private individuals and that Congress
had not authorized the officials to abrogate.” Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
47 See id. at 613 (“Congress can authorize the political branches to take actions that bind
the public without any judicial involvement at all.”).
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be called deferential judicial review.48 For example, it could give
private beneficiaries access to the writ of mandamus.49 On
mandamus, a court could compel the performance of a
non-discretionary official duty in favor of a private person. It could
order, for example, that a copy of a commission be delivered as
required by statute.50 Mandamus could not be used to direct the
performance of a discretionary duty, however.51 As a result, if the
only private recourse was through mandamus, exercises of
discretion by the executive would be final. Discretion included not
only policy judgments, but also the application of law to fact in
contestable situations.52 Congress could also provide that the courts
would correct all executive errors and give relief to private
beneficiaries with no deference to the prior executive
determination.53
Perhaps the most important feature of the older system was a
distinction between different kinds of interests. Congress could not
48 See id. at 572 (“The political branches controlled purely public rights, and they could
also retain unilateral authority over privileges that they allowed individuals to exercise as
public trusts.”).
49 See id. at 584 (“Congress could itself adjudicate the eligibility of individual beneficiaries,
and it could also commit eligibility determinations to nonjudicial tribunals.”).
50 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803) (noting that withholding
such a commission was “violative of a vested legal right”).
51 A leading nineteenth century example is Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497
(1840). Congress had directed the Secretary of the Navy to pay pensions to the widows of
naval officers under specified circumstances and had also provided a pension specifically for
Susan Decatur, the widow of Commodore Stephen Decatur. Id. at 513–14. Susan Decatur
sought a writ of mandamus that would direct the Secretary to pay both pensions. Id. at 514.
The Attorney General advised the Secretary that, under the statutes, Mrs. Decatur could
elect either the specific or general pension, not both. Id. The Court concluded that the official
act involved was discretionary and not ministerial because judgment concerning the meaning
of the statutes involved discretion, so mandamus was not available. Id. at 515–16. The Court
stressed that the limits on mandamus did not mean that the Secretary’s decision would be
binding on the courts in a proceeding where they were under no such limitation. Id. at 515.
The limits on judicial review of an executive decision concerning disposition of public funds
thus turned on the limits of the judicially enforceable private rights that Congress had
created, not on the conclusion that executive officials exercised adjudicatory powers to which
courts should defer as they would to other courts.
52 Id. at 515–16.
53 A classic counterpoint to Decatur v. Paulding is Kendall v. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524
(1838). In Kendall, the Court concluded that Congress had imposed on the executive a
ministerial duty to make a credit to the account of specified postal contractors, and that the
contractors were entitled to mandamus to the Postmaster General in a jurisdiction where
mandamus was available. Id. at 613–14. Because mandamus was available to enforce only
non-discretionary ministerial duties, mandamus cases called on the courts to decide whether
the legislature had granted the executive discretion or had imposed unconditional duties
enforceable by the courts.
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provide for executive adjudication with respect to what Nelson calls
“‘core’ private rights.”54 Defined with reference to Lockean political
theory, core private rights were legal rights patterned on rights that
people had in the state of nature and that did not depend on
government.55 Ordinary private rights of personal security and
liberty of movement, and of property, were leading examples.56 As
Nelson points out, not all legal relations between private people
were core private rights.57 Some inter-private relations were based
on so-called franchises, such as the right to operate a bridge.
Franchises were given to private people and good against other
private people if a monopoly had been granted, but they were given
in the public interest and were not simply private rights.58
B. PUBLIC RIGHTS, PRIVATE PRIVILEGES, AND EXECUTIVE POWER

This Section derives the basic principles of the nineteenth
century system from the interaction of the differences between
rights and privileges and between executive and judicial power.
1. Private Rights, Public Rights, and Private Privileges.
Public rights as understood in the nineteenth century system
were ownership-type interests of the government or the public at
large which were administered by the government.59 Like any
owner, the government can take some steps that affect the legal
position of another but do not violate that other person’s rights or
require the other’s consent.60 For example, property owners may
freely decide whether to make a gift of their property. The decision
not to make the gift inflicts no legally cognizable harm, but it does
make the other person worse off compared to the decision to make
the gift. Ownership rights thus are related to the interests of others
Nelson, supra note 7, at 567.
Id. (“Inspired by Lockean political theory, [Anglo-American lawyers] distinguished
what . . . [Nelson] call[s] ‘core’ private rights (which Lockean tradition associated with the
natural rights that individuals would enjoy even in the absence of political society) from mere
‘privileges’ or ‘franchises’ (which public authorities had created purely for reasons of public
policy and which had no counterpart in the Lockean state of nature).” (footnote omitted)).
56 Id. (discussing Blackstone’s account of core private rights).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 567–68.
59 See id. at 570 (describing treasury funds and government-owned real estate as examples
of public rights).
60 See id. at 570–71 (discussing how the political branches could act to revoke public rights
and privileges).
54
55
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that are not themselves legally protected.61 In the older
terminology, those interests were called privileges.62 Public rights
correlated with private privileges.63
As Nelson explains, the concept of public versus private rights in
the nineteenth century reflected the distinction between “legal
interests that were vested in discrete individuals” and “legal
interests that belonged to the public as a whole.”64 Classic
nineteenth century public rights cases demonstrate how the rights
of the public related to private people’s interests that were not
themselves rights.65
At the head of the list of public rights cases is a profoundly
influential nineteenth century decision about executive
adjudication and Article III that referred to public rights: Murray’s
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.66 In a frequently quoted
passage, Justice Curtis, writing for the Court, says:
[W]e do not consider congress can either withdraw from
judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature,
is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity,
or admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under
the judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is
not a subject for judicial determination. At the same
time there are matters, involving public rights, which
may be presented in such form that the judicial power
is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible
of judicial determination, but which congress may or
See id. (describing rights that are not legally protected).
See id. at 571 (explaining that privileges were private interests that were gratuitously
granted by the legislature and could be recalled because they were not vested rights).
63 See id. at 572 (“The political branches controlled purely public rights, and they could
also retain unilateral authority over privileges that they allowed individuals to exercise as
public trusts.”).
64 Id. at 566 (explaining the distinction between public and private rights).
65 See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 283–
84 (1855) (discussing public rights, the separation of powers, and how the government
compares to private persons); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (Wheeling
Bridge II), 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1855) (discussing private rights and the obstruction of
public rights).
66 59 U.S. at 284 (discussing public rights and the separation of powers). Justice Brennan
in Northern Pipeline began his discussion of public rights cases with Murray’s Lessee. 458
U.S. 50, 63 (1982) (discussing how past cases still support judicial power being vested in the
courts), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, as recognized in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135
S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
61
62

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

19

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 5

162

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:143

may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the
United States, as it may deem proper.67
Justice Curtis’s opinion is an important source of the principle
that public rights are connected to the separation of powers and that
Congress has discretion in that connection with respect to the roles
of the executive and the judiciary.68
The public right involved in Murray’s Lessee was a proprietary
interest of the government: its claim as creditor against a
government employee who had collected large amounts on the
government’s behalf and had not remitted the money to the
Treasury.69 After auditing the accounts of Samuel Swartwout,
Collector of the Port of New York, in 1838, the Treasury Department
concluded that Swartwout owed the United States more than
$1,000,000 in tariff payments that he had received and not passed
on.70 The Solicitor of the Treasury used the statutory debt collection
tool of a distress warrant to seize and sell assets of Swartwout,
including the real estate at issue in Murray’s Lessee.71 Under the
statute, the distress warrant was the kind of collection process that
did not require judicial involvement.72 The question before the
Court was whether the non-judicial collection procedure used by the
Solicitor to collect the government’s debt had legal effects in the
absence of any judicial proceeding.73 If the distress warrant was
effective, the party in Murray’s Lessee claiming title through the
Marshal’s sale would prevail.74 If the distress warrant was
ineffective, on the other hand, another creditor of Swartwout, who
sought recovery against the same real estate but acted after the
distress warrant had been issued, would have superior title.75
The Court concluded that the distress warrant had effect even
though it was not and could not be an exercise of judicial power,
59 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added).
Id.
69 Id. at 275 (explaining that the solicitor of the treasury issued a warrant for a balance of
over $1,000,000).
70 Id. (stating the exact amount to be $1,374,119.65).
71 Id. at 274–75 (issuing the distress warrant under an act of Congress).
72 The distress warrant created a lien on Swartwout’s real estate, giving rise to a Marshal’s
sale that purported to vest title to one of the claimants to the property at stake in Murray’s
Lessee. Id. at 272.
73 Id. at 275–76.
74 Id. at 274.
75 Id. (describing competing claims to the real estate formerly held by Swartwout).
67
68
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having been issued by an executive officer.76 Justice Curtis agreed
that an action in court against a debtor like Swartwout was one of
Congress’s options in providing for collection of debts owed the
government.77 The real question was whether it was the only
option.78 It was not, he concluded, pointing to other modes by which
one private person can collect a debt owed by another.79 “The United
States may thus place the government upon the same ground which
is occupied by private persons who proceed to take extra-judicial
remedies for their wrongs, and they may do so to such extent, and
with such restrictions, as may be thought fit.”80 Having explained
that the United States was exercising a legal power conferred on it
as a creditor, Justice Curtis went on to make his famous statement
that while Congress could not “withdraw from judicial cognizance
any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the
common law, or in equity, or admiralty” or “bring under the judicial
power a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject for judicial
determination.”81 There were also “matters, involving public rights”
which might be susceptible of judicial determination, but might or
might not be brought before the “cognizance of the courts” by
Congress.82 Public rights were the ownership interests of the

76 Id. at 275 (explaining that the distress warrant would have been void had it been “an
exercise of the judicial power of the United States”).
77 See id. at 276 (“That the warrant now in question is legal process, is not denied.”).
78 To show that the distress warrant could not be effective without judicial involvement,
[i]t is necessary to go further, and show not only that the adjustment of the
balances due from accounting officers may be, but from their nature must be,
controversies to which the United States is a party within the meaning of the
second section of the third article of the Constitution.
Id. at 280–81.
79 Id. at 283 (“Though, generally, both public and private wrongs are redressed through
judicial action, there are more summary extra-judicial remedies for both. An instance of
extra-judicial redress of a private wrong is, the recapture of goods by their lawful owner; of a
public wrong, by a private person, is the abatement of a public nuisance; and the recovery of
public dues by a summary process of distress, issued by some public officer authorized by law,
is an instance of redress of a particular kind of public wrong, by the act of the public through
its authorized agents.”).
80 Id. at 284. Justice Curtis made clear that the government’s position as creditor was
similar to that of a private person. Id. at 283–84. The government has sovereign immunity
and may limit a private party’s redress after it has used a summary collection process. Id.
81 Id. at 284.
82 Id.
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government.83 Those included its rights as creditor and as owner of
the public lands.84
Justice Curtis’s comparison of debt collection with grants of
public lands is especially instructive with respect to the private
interests that may be affected by the exercise of public rights.85 Both
of the private interests involved in those situations are privileges in
the conceptual scheme underlying the nineteenth century system of
executive adjudication. In both contexts, the government in its
proprietary capacity may take an action that affects the interest of
a private person but does not violate the private person’s legal
rights. As to land grants, the private interest is in receiving a
benefit, which the government could confer or not. In Murray’s
Lessee, the government as creditor could decide whether to take
action adverse to Swartwout’s interest but not violative of his rights.
His interest in forbearance by the government from using its
non-judicial remedy was like the interest in receiving a grant: both
could be affected by a government act that was consistent with the
private person’s rights but not necessarily in the private person’s
interests.
Another case from the 1850s shows the wide range of ownership
interests that qualified as public rights and illustrates the
connection between public rights and private interests that are not
rights.86 That case was the second of two U.S. Supreme Court
decisions involving the contest between Pennsylvania and the
Wheeling Bridge Company.87 The bridge company had constructed
a bridge over the Ohio River at Wheeling (then in Virginia).88 The
bridge obstructed steamboat traffic on the Ohio, interfering with
voyages to and from Pittsburgh.89 Pennsylvania sued the bridge
company in the Court’s original jurisdiction, arguing that the bridge
Id.
Id. (“Equitable claims to land by the inhabitants of ceded territories form a striking
instance of such a class of cases; and as it depends upon the will of Congress whether a remedy
in the courts shall be allowed at all, in such cases, they may regulate it and prescribe such
rules of determination as they may think just and needful. Thus, it has been repeatedly
decided in this class of cases that, upon their trial, the acts of executive officers, done under
the authority of Congress, were conclusive either upon particular facts involved in the inquiry
or upon the whole title.”).
85 Id. at 276–78.
86 See generally Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 430.
89 Id. at 429.
83
84
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was an obstruction of interstate commerce and therefore a
nuisance.90 Pennsylvania asserted not a sovereign interest but the
interest a private person might have: the Commonwealth had made
substantial investments in docks and other facilities at Pittsburgh,
and reduced river traffic decreased the value of those investments.91
The Court agreed with Pennsylvania and issued an injunction
requiring that the bridge be raised or removed.92
In response to that decision, Congress adopted a statutory
provision authorizing the bridge and declaring it a post road.93
When Pennsylvania sought enforcement of the injunction in the
U.S. Supreme Court, the bridge company replied that the injunction
should be lifted because the bridge was no longer a nuisance under
the law.94 In Wheeling Bridge II, a decision that remains important
for the relations between legislative and judicial power, the Court
said that Congress could change the applicable substantive law with
its power to regulate commerce, and so could make a nuisance into
a non-nuisance.95 When the substantive law changed, the injunction
that enforced it should adapt, lest lawful conduct be restrained.
The Court then addressed the objection that the statute was void
because it would annul a private right created by the injunction.96
Judgments could create such rights, the Court agreed, and
legislation could not affect them.97 The Wheeling Bridge cases were
different. The bridge’s “interference with the free navigation of the
river constitute[d] an obstruction of a public right secured by acts of
Congress.”98 Private parties specially affected by the obstruction

90 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (Wheeling Bridge I), 54 U.S. (13 How.)
518, 557 (1851).
91 See id. at 560 (“When a State enters into a copartnership, or becomes a stockholder in
a bank, or other corporation, its sovereignty is not involved in the business, but it stands and
is treated as other stockholders, or partners. And so in the present case, the rights asserted
and relief prayed, are considered as in no respect different from those of an individual.”).
92 Id. at 626–27 (“[T]he complaint has a just and legal right to have the navigation of said
river made free.”).
93 Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 429.
94 Id.
95 See id. at 431 (finding the power to regulate commerce among the states brings with it
“the power to determine what shall or shall not be deemed in judgment of law an obstruction
to navigation”).
96 Id.
97 Id. (“[Congress cannot annul] adjudication upon the private rights of parties. When they
have passed into judgment the right becomes absolute, and it is the duty of courts to enforce
it.”).
98 Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

23

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 5

166

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:143

could maintain lawsuits, but the private right to sue “arises out of
the unlawful interference with the enjoyment of the public right,
which, as we have seen, is under the regulation of Congress.”99 A
private damages judgment would create a private right, but the
injunction the Court had granted depended on violation of the public
right, and because of the new legislation there was no interference
with that right.100
Wheeling Bridge II illuminates several aspects of nineteenth
century thinking about public rights. First, it shows that public
rights included interests short of full title, like the public right of
navigation, a servitude.101 Second, Congress was able to act on
behalf of the public through its power to regulate interstate
commerce.102 Congress could decide which interferences with
navigation were permissible and which were impermissible.103 By
regulating conduct, Congress could exercise an owner’s power to
give or withhold permission to take action that would be
inconsistent with the owner’s interest. When Congress gave
permission to the bridge company, it restricted another
permission—the public’s liberty to navigate.104 Just like an owner,
Congress could restrict its own—that is, the public’s—freedom of
action by granting freedom of action to someone else.105 Control of
interstate commerce, a form of conduct, thus enabled Congress to
act on behalf of the public as an owner. Third, private parties (which
for these purposes included the State of Pennsylvania) participated
in the public’s right on terms set by Congress, which controlled that
right.106 That participation was subject to change by Congress, and
prospective changes did not divest any private right.107
Id.
See id. at 431–32 (holding that “[t]he decree before us . . . stands upon the same
principles[] and is unaffected by the subsequent law”).
101 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 566 (discussing servitudes as public rights).
102 Id. at 596.
103 Id.
104 See id. at 570 (citing Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 21–22 (N.Y. 1829)) (explaining
Congress’s power to regulate navigation rights at the expense of individual use of public
waters).
105 See id. (“If the appropriate legislative body so desired, it could authoritatively permit
private companies to construct bridges or dams that would hinder or even completely defeat
navigation along particular rivers.”).
106 See Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431–32 (1855) (explaining that Congress
had authority to regulate the public right of navigation and private parties must adhere to
Congress’s determination).
107 Id. at 432.
99

100
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As Wheeling Bridge II shows, public rights could be used to confer
benefits, which were not rights, on private people. Navigation was
a benefit for private people under the legal control of someone
else.108 It could be affected by Congress in the exercise of its control
over the public right of navigation.109 Wheeling Bridge II, like
Murray’s Lessee, shows how the exercise of public rights affects
private people.110
Another important example of a public right, which Nelson
discusses, is public land.111 Congress could grant public lands by
statute.112 It could also set up a system by which such grants were
to be made by executive officials.113 If Congress created a system to
distribute public lands, it could change that system with respect to
lands that had not been distributed.114 Once a particular parcel was
granted to a private person, ownership of it was a private right,
protected from divestment.115
Like participation in the public right of navigation, other benefits
consisting of bundles of legal interests with respect to ongoing
activities were subject to cancellation. Tax exemptions for a
business, if they had not become vested rights through contract,
could be withdrawn.116 So could permissions to operate a business
combined with a monopoly, again provided that no contractual right
had been created.117
The older practice thus identified a category of private interests
that the government could affect in its discretion. That discretion
meant that those interests, though often quite important, were not
rights in the sense of a public or private right—they were not
108 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 570 (noting Congress’s ability to grant private parties the
right to affect navigation).
109 Id.
110 See generally Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (holding an act of Congress
which allowed reconstruction of a bridge over public waters was not an unlawful obstruction
of the public right of navigation).
111 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 566 (identifying title to public land as a “public right[]
belonging to the people at large”).
112 Id. at 577.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 571 (“[I]t cannot be denied that the Legislature possess the power to take away
by statute what was given by statute, except vested rights.” (quoting People ex rel. Fleming
v. Livingston, 6 Wend. 526, 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831))).
115 Id. at 578.
116 Id. at 571.
117 See id. (explaining the right of legislatures to bestow privileges on private individuals
and retract such privileges before contractual or property rights have vested).
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themselves legally protected.118 Those interests were affected by the
exercise of public rights, which were ownership interests, but of the
public.119 As a creditor of Swartwout, the government could decide
whether to use its right of extrajudicial debt collection.120 Having
created the public right of navigation through its regulation of
commerce, Congress could decide on the content of that right and
thereby affect private people who were allowed to participate in the
servitude held by the public.121 As owner of the public lands,
Congress could distribute them.122
The private interests that were not rights were private privileges
as that term was used in the older system.123 A private privilege in
this context is thus a private interest that may be affected by the
unilateral, non-consensual exercise of a public right.124 Private
privileges are correlated with the legal powers that come with public
rights; the interest in receiving a federal land grant can be affected
by, and so is correlated with, the government’s power to dispose of
the public lands, a power that comes with ownership.125 Because the
government as owner has an owner’s liberty to exercise its rights,
118 See id. (“[L]egislatures also enjoyed unilateral authority over the quasi-private
‘privileges’ that they created for reasons of public policy.”).
119 Id. at 572.
120 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284
(1855).
121 See Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1855) (explaining “[t]he regulation
of commerce includes intercourse and navigation, and, of course, the power to determine what
shall or shall not be deemed in judgment of law an obstruction to navigation; and that power,
as we have seen, has been exercised consistent with the continuance of the bridge”).
122 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 577–78 (discussing the congressional disposition of public
lands).
123 See id. at 567 (distinguishing rights and privileges). The older terminology also could be
more particularized, picking out franchises as a specific kind of private privilege.
124 See id. at 572 (“The political branches controlled purely public rights, and they could
also retain unilateral authority over privileges . . . .”). Privileges are usually understood as
interests in favorable treatment. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913) (noting the words
“right” and “privilege” are often defined similarly, including “the investiture with special or
peculiar rights” (citing United States v. Patrick, 54 F. 338, 348 (M.D. Tenn. 1893))). Public
rights, like private rights, can be exercised in ways both favorable and unfavorable to others.
For example, in Murray’s Lessee, the government’s public right as creditor would have an
adverse effect on a private person when it was used. That possibility can be squared with the
assumption that privileges are interests in benefits by describing the privilege in such
situations as an interest in forbearance. The interest of a tenant at sufferance is like that: a
tenant at sufferance may remain in the premises until the landlord exercises the right to
demand that the tenant vacate.
125 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 566 (commenting on Congress’s power to dispose of public
lands by virtue of ownership).
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potential beneficiaries themselves are not entitled to demand that
public rights be exercised in a way favorable to them.126 Private
privileges are thus the opposite of rights, private and public.127 A
right-holder is protected by the duties of others with respect to the
interest in question: property owners can require that non-owners
not trespass.128 Right-holders are also protected in many ways from
non-consensual changes in their legal positions: non-owners may
not transfer others’ interests, for example.129
The concept of a private privilege must be used with care in
describing particular situations. Consider, for example, the
situation in which Congress has provided by statute for the
payment of veterans’ pensions that are not required by contract. If
the statute requires that executive officials make payments as
prescribed but does not give beneficiaries any judicially enforceable
claim against the United States, the interest in receiving payments
under the statute will be a privilege and not a right. If the statute
provides for judicial enforcement, then the private interest will be a
right. In either case, however, Congress will remain free to repeal
the statute as to future payments.130 As a result, if a statute
provides for judicial enforcement of benefits, private beneficiaries
have rights under the statute but no right that the statute continue.
Their interests will be rights in one respect and privileges in
another. A federal bondholder, by contrast, has a right in a less
qualified sense. Even if Congress eliminates the appropriation for
paying the debt, the government’s obligation to pay it will remain

126 See id. at 567–68 (explaining that potential privileges do not vest control in individuals
in the same way as private rights).
127 See Hohfeld, supra note 124, at 32 (“[A] privilege is the opposite of a duty, and the
correlative of a ‘no-right.’”).
128 See id. (noting that an owner’s right that no one enter without permission correlates
with other people’s duties not to enter).
129 In analytic terms, a private person with a privilege relative to the government has no
right that the government exercise its power in some way and is liable to a change in legal
position resulting from the government’s exercise of that power. Correlatively, the
government has power to affect the private person and a liberty to exercise that power (which
means no duty not to exercise it). See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 1–4 (AM. LAW INST.
1936) (defining rights and correlative duties and powers and correlative liabilities to the
exercise of power).
130 See, e.g., Nelson supra note 7, at 571 (“[I]t cannot be denied that the Legislature possess
the power to take away by statute what was given by statute, except vested rights.” (quoting
People ex rel. Fleming v. Livingston, 6 Wend. 526, 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831))).
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because the obligation of a contract is distinct from the remedies
available to enforce it.131
The most easily understood examples of public rights and
corresponding private privileges involved material assets that were
the property of the government, like Treasury funds and public
lands. Like a private owner, Congress was free to transfer those
assets or retain them as it chose.132 If title was transferred, the asset
became a private right in the new owner. Until a transfer was made,
however, private people had no rights with respect to the asset, and
hence no legally enforceable claim to it.133 That was true as to future
transfers and remained true if Congress created a program of
grants; such programs could be discontinued with no violation of
private rights.134
Less tangible benefits were legally more complicated. An
especially important form of intangible benefit was a license. When
Congress used a regulatory power to impose a general prohibition
that could be relaxed through a license, it put the government in the
position of a private owner who could demand that others not
interfere with the owner’s interest or could relax that demand.135
Private owners could have rights of that kind with respect to
tangible assets, like real estate, and intangibles, like patents; for
example, the licensing system for the Indian trade operated like a
patent.136 A category of conduct was prohibited, and a right-holder
could enforce that prohibition and release others from it.137

131 See, e.g., Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370, 378 (1827) (holding that elimination
of imprisonment for debt is permissible under the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution
because it operates only on the remedy of the contract, not the obligation under it).
132 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (enabling Congress to “dispose of” the territory and
other property of the United States).
133 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 566 (noting that public funds and public property were
public rights); id. at 568–69 (describing how political branches controlled the disposition of
public rights).
134 See id. at 571 (discussing how Congress could revoke ongoing grants of public rights).
135 As Chief Justice Marshall explained in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824),
Congress exercised its commerce power over the coasting trade, id. at 211–12, and gave
licenses, which he defined as “permission or authority” to engage in the trade, id. at 213.
136 See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (repealed 1809) (forbidding trade with the
Indian tribes except with a license granted by the government).
137 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 566 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *7)
(explaining that public rights included the intangible right to compliance with laws that
secured the public good).
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A similar arrangement was involved in Wheeling Bridge I.138 The
law governing interstate commerce created a public servitude of
navigation, with which a bridge might interfere.139 Congress,
through its commerce power, could determine the content of that
servitude, and so decide whether a bridge over a navigable river
interfered with it, as a physical obstruction can unlawfully interfere
with an easement.140 Once the servitude was in place, Congress
could allow the public at large to participate in it.141 As Wheeling
Bridge II shows, the servitude remained a public right, and
participation was not a private right.142 In similar fashion, a private
owner can give permission to another private person to use it, and
that permission can be revoked with no legal harm inflicted.143
Just as the character of public rights as rights of ownership
explains why some private interests were nothing more than
expectancies in favorable treatment, the understanding of public
rights and private privileges explains the other crucial category
Professor Nelson identifies: core private rights. Core private rights
were based on the rights enjoyed in the state of nature of Lockean
political theory.144 In Lockean theory, civil society was instituted

138 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 558 (1851) (holding that Pennsylvania was entitled to a decree
requiring an obstructing bridge be removed or elevated because Congress afforded a right to
the public that the navigation of the Ohio River not be obstructed).
139 See Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 435 (1855) (“[C]ongress had acted upon
the subject and had regulated the navigation of the Ohio River, and had thereby secured to
the public, by virtue of its authority, the free and unobstructed use of the same . . . .”).
140 Id. at 431.
141 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 566 (describing how public rights included servitudes, such
as navigation of rivers and passage on public roads, that could be used by the public but were
collectively, not privately, held).
142 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431.
143 See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 438 (3d ed. 2000)
(distinguishing a license, which may be revoked at any time, from an easement, which is an
estate in land that lasts for a specified time or perpetually). In giving permissions, Congress
could grant stronger or weaker interests, as a private person could. While it might give just
a permission to engage in some conduct, it could also give a private person an interest more
like a leasehold. Leaseholds entail not only a right in the lessee to use the leased property,
but also the right to exclude third parties. Id. at 255 (noting that a leasehold is an estate in
land bringing right to possession). Congress could give a franchisee an enforceable monopoly,
allowing the franchisee to engage in some conduct, forbidding others from doing so, and
allowing the franchisee to enforce that prohibition as long as the franchise continued. Nelson,
supra note 7, at 567.
144 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 567 (noting that core private rights were associated with
the rights that individuals would enjoy in the state of nature).
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largely to make those rights more secure.145 A right found in the
state of nature could have no component of government ownership
because there is no government in the state of nature.146 As long as
the law of civil society recognized private legal advantages that had
that feature, they were wholly private and not public.147 By contrast,
with franchises, like a bridge monopoly given to a private person in
the public interest, the government might well have a component of
ownership, like an ongoing power to revoke the franchise.148 The
state of nature has no government-granted bridge monopolies, nor
invention patents.
2. Powers of Government and Public and Private Interests.
In the nineteenth century system of executive adjudication,
public rights were ownership interests of or controlled by the
government, and private privileges were private interests in the
favorable exercise of public rights.149 The system rested on the
interaction between the correlative concepts of public rights and
private privileges on one hand, and aspects of the three powers of
government on the other.150 That system allowed absolute finality
in the political branches with respect to public rights and, therefore,
with respect to the private positions that could be affected by
unilateral exercises of those public rights.151 That conclusion
followed from the rights-privilege distinction and certain
assumptions concerning each of the powers of government.
A principal assumption of the nineteenth century system
concerned the executive power. A core function of the executive is to
145 See id. (describing John Locke’s argument that “the ‘great and chief end’ of government
was to make individual life, liberty, and property more secure than they would be in the state
of nature” (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 368 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690))).
146 See LOCKE, supra note 145, at 294 (“Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the
Inconveniences of the State of Nature . . . .”).
147 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 567 (distinguishing core private rights, which “individuals
would enjoy even in the absence of political society,” from privileges or franchises, “which
public authorities had created purely for reasons of public policy”).
148 See, e.g., id. (examining how franchises “could operate just like private rights” as long
as “the legislature permitted them to exist”).
149 See, e.g., Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From
Murray’s Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 796 (1986) (emphasizing
the public versus private distinction in discussing historical views of non-Article III
adjudication).
150 Id. at 830 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525, 531–39 (1934)).
151 Id. at 818–19.
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exercise the proprietary rights of the government itself according to
law.152 Executive officials manage government property and enter
into contracts for the United States.153 When payments are to be
made to private people, either pursuant to a contract or
gratuitously, executive officials withdraw funds from the Treasury
and transfer them to payees.154 Executive officials follow the law in
doing so, but the actual transactions are carried out by the
Executive Branch. In performing those functions, executive officials
are doing no more than their core work of carrying out the law and
conducting the operations of the government.155
Often, the actions of the executive in exercising the government’s
proprietary rights will have effects on private people. Private people
may receive or be denied payments, they may be given or denied
access to government property, and the government may contract
with them or decline to do so. When a government decision affects a
private person, but is not subject to any duty that runs to an affected
private person, the private position is that of a privilege.156 The
exercise of a public right that affects a private privilege may have
an important practical effect on the private party, but under the
nineteenth century system those practical effects do not turn a
152 For example, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs is authorized by statute to exercise the
government’s rights with respect to real property in performing official functions. See 38
U.S.C. § 8103 (2012) (identifying that the Secretary may construct, alter, or acquire sites for
medical facilities for veterans); id. § 8106(a) (providing that the Secretary may carry out
construction of medical facilities by contract).
153 Managing government property is such a central function of the Executive Branch that
today there is an executive agency, the General Services Administration, devoted to the task.
See 40 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (establishing the General Services Administration); id.
§ 501(b)(1)(A) (providing that the Administrator of General Services is responsible for
supplying property needed by executive agencies in the performance of their functions). In
similar fashion, there is an executive official whose function is to oversee and coordinate the
procurement activities of the rest of the Executive Branch. See 41 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012)
(creating the Office of Federal Procurement Policy in the Office of Management and Budget
to “provide overall direction of Government-wide procurement policies, regulations,
procedures, and forms for executive agencies”).
154 See 31 U.S.C. § 3321 (2012) (identifying officials who are authorized to disburse public
funds available for expenditure by executive agencies).
155 In his important study of the development of non-Article III adjudication, Professor
Gordon Young explains that antebellum courts, in giving conclusive force to some executive
decisions that applied law to particular facts, “simply viewed the actions as executive action,
and treated them as valid activity by that branch of government.” Young, supra note 149, at
796 (emphasizing that executive decisions in situations involving public rights were valid
activity of the executive because that branch of government is charged with exercising the
ownership rights of the government).
156 Nelson, supra note 7, at 567.
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privilege into a right. Executive adjudication through the exercise
of public rights, with correlative effects on private interests that are
not rights, is thus an unproblematic exercise of executive power.
The nineteenth century system also rested on an assumption
about the legislative power. When public rights and private
privileges were at stake, Congress could decide whether the courts
were to be involved, and if so to what extent.157 It could leave
executive action wholly to the executive or provide for limited or full
judicial review.158 The absence of judicial involvement, however, did
not mean executive discretion. If a statute called for a benefit to be
conferred, the relevant executive officials were required to pay it.159
That is how executive officials can be said to have engaged in
adjudication: they applied law to specific facts and acted
accordingly. When they did so without judicial involvement, they
were in a sense final.
The older system thus assumed that Congress was able to impose
duties on executive officials that could not be enforced by private
people, including, in particular, the beneficiaries of favorable use of
government proprietary interests. That kind of arrangement is
familiar from private law. For example, a principal may direct an
agent to make a gratuitous payment to a third party without
creating any claim by the third party against either agent or
principal.160 Under those circumstances, the agent does have a duty,

157 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284
(1855).
158 Id. at 283–84.
159 In Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 (1884), a private suit to compel issuance of a patent,
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that executive officials must perform their duties and
that those duties are enforceable by private suit when Congress so decides. Concerning the
Secretary of the Interior’s duties related to the issuance of patents, “[i]f the Secretary is
charged by law with the performance of such a duty, he is bound to fulfill it.” Id. at 57. The
Court then distinguished between duties that run to “the public alone” and those that
Congress has decided run to private people who have “acquire[d] by law a personal interest
in the performance” of official acts. Id. As to whether Congress had provided for private
enforcement in any particular statute, the Court stated, “[e]ach case must be governed by its
own text, upon a full view of all the statutory provisions intended to express the meaning of
the legislature.” Id. at 56–57.
160 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981) (noting that a contract creates
a duty to intended beneficiaries who are not parties and that may be enforced by them); id.
§ 302 (detailing that intended, as opposed to incidental, third-party beneficiaries are
identified by the intention of the contracting parties). The result is that the parties control
whether a third party beneficiary is intended or incidental, and no duty runs to an incidental
beneficiary.
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but it runs only to the principal and can be enforced only by the
principal.
Any judicially enforceable private rights concerning the exercise
of public rights would run against the government itself, so it is
natural to think of Congress’s power as deriving from sovereign
immunity and the ability to waive it. Justice Curtis in Murray’s
Lessee described Congress’s ability to provide for judicial
involvement in terms of waiving sovereign immunity.161 As Nelson
has pointed out, however, more is involved here than just sovereign
immunity, narrowly speaking.162 To prevail in court, a plaintiff
must have what would today be called a cause of action. Put in
nineteenth century terms, the question whether a plaintiff had a
cause of action was the question whether the plaintiff had a right
for which there was a judicial remedy.163 Congress’s control over the
availability of judicial review thus depended not only on its power
to waive sovereign immunity but, more fundamentally, on its power
to create primary private rights and remedies to enforce them when
the executive exercises public rights. Although Justice Curtis wrote
in terms of waiving immunity in Murray’s Lessee, he may have been
referring more broadly to providing for relief against the
government.164 The crucial point is that the nineteenth century
system assumed that legislative power could detach the duties of
executive officials that ran to the United States from duties of the

161 See Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 283 (“It is equally clear that the United States
may consent to be sued[] and may yield this consent upon such terms and under such
restrictions as it may think just.”).
162 Because public benefit programs, for example, were privileges and not core private
rights, Congress could decide whether to continue them. That decision was not simply a
matter of waiving sovereign immunity; it concerned the existence of the primary right. See
Nelson, supra note 7, at 583–84. Before Congress enacted the Social Security Act, the question
whether it had waived sovereign immunity with respect to claims for Social Security benefits
could not arise.
163 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154 (1803) (asking whether Marbury has
“a right to the commission he demands,” whether “the laws of his country afford him a
remedy,” and whether that remedy is “a mandamus issuing from this court”). Provision for a
judicial remedy against the government included a waiver of sovereign immunity, as
mandamus enforces the specific duties of government officers. Id. at 168–69.
164 As Professor Young explains, when the government granted a benefit in the nineteenth
century, “[p]roceedings against the government for damages required a granted privilege of
suing the government.” Young, supra note 149, at 797. The privilege of suing the government
includes, but is not limited to, a waiver of sovereign immunity.
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United States to private beneficiaries that could be judicially
enforced.165
Neither of those assumptions about executive and legislative
power should be surprising. Executive officials administer
government assets. Legislatures make law, including the law
governing executive administration of government assets and the
primary and remedial rights of private people against the
government. More surprising may be the older system’s
assumptions concerning judicial power. That system did not require
judicial power to operate differently as to different legal interests.
In particular, the judicial power did not entail any mandatory role
for the courts with respect to core private rights. Rather, the older
system was consistent with a conceptualization of the judicial power
that draws no distinctions between core private rights and other
rights, and the older system also draws no distinctions among legal
rules dealing with public and private interests. It was consistent
with the assumption that executive decisions applying law to fact
do not bind courts the way an earlier judicial decision does. The
different treatment of rights and privileges, and in particular the
different treatment of public benefits and what Nelson calls core
private rights, follows from the operation of executive power. That
operation does not require that executive officials’ decisions
applying law to fact bind later courts the way one court binds
another.
Just as legislative power can be seen simply as the authority to
make and change legal rules, judicial power can be conceived simply
as the authority independently and conclusively to apply legal rules,
whatever they may be. Under this conceptualization, courts apply
legal rules to resolve disputed issues of law and fact. They do so
independently—that is, without regard to any earlier decision by
any non-judicial government actor. As Chief Justice Marshall put
it, they say what the law is.166 When the case calls on them to do so,
they also apply the law of remedies. Their remedies often change
the legal relations of parties, for example by giving the defendant
an obligation to pay damages to the plaintiff. Only courts can

165 The question of statutory construction that the Court confronted in Butterworth v. Hoe,
112 U.S. 50, 50 (1884), was whether Congress intended that the plaintiff be able to enforce
the duties of the Commissioner of Patents and the Secretary of the Interior.
166 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“It is emphatically the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”).
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change legal relations in that way. Once a court has decided a case,
its judgment is binding on the parties and, for that reason, on later
courts as called for by the law of preclusion.167
The older system did not require that the executive exercise or
share any of the judicial power as just described. In administering
public rights, executive officials acted in a way that private
individuals act in exercising private rights. Officials decided how
legal rules applied to particular factual situations, just as a private
person might. Agents, for example, routinely have to determine
their legal obligations to their principals in order to know how to
act. Executive officials could change the legal positions of private
people but not by applying the law of remedies to conclusions about
primary relations. Instead, they changed private legal relations the
way a grantor does in making a gift, or the way the holder of a call
under a contract does by exercising the call. In doing so, they did
not collaterally bind future courts the way a court does. Rather, the
actions that executive officials took that courts were required to
respect were of the same kind as the acts that private owners took
that courts were required to respect. If a private owner gave or
refused a license to enter property, the courts would give that
decision effect. Similarly, when executive officials exercised public
rights, the courts would give those decisions effect. When courts
took into account exercises of rights (private or public), they were
not treating those exercises of rights as binding decisions by earlier
courts.
All the courts had to do under the older system was apply the
law. If the law gave a private person a right and remedy against the
government with respect to the exercise of a public right, they would
act accordingly. If not, they would not act. If the remedy was limited,
as mandamus was, the courts would inquire as much as the remedy
required. A court deciding whether to grant mandamus would
decide for itself whether the executive decision in question was
ministerial or discretionary.
Courts distinguished between rights and privileges only as a
result of applying the law. If a private party was subject to the
unilateral exercise of a public right—that is, if the private party had
a privilege and not a right—the courts would give no relief. For the
same reason, they would also give no relief to a private plaintiff with
167 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (1980) (stating that a valid judgment is
binding on parties in future litigation).
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a purported claim under a contract with another private party that
the court found had never been made. Plaintiffs with no rights are
not entitled to remedies. A private person with a privilege but no
right relative to the potential exercise of a public right would have
no remedy for an unfavorable exercise of the right.
The role of core private rights that Professor Nelson observes in
the older system did not require any special role with respect to
them for the judicial power.168 As far as the courts were concerned,
one right was like another. The difference involved the executive
power. Government ownership—a public right—was a predicate for
executive adjudication because administration of public rights is an
executive function. Executive officials administer public (not
private) rights, and so they do not control the interests secured by
the latter.169 Being wholly private, core private rights had no
element of government ownership. That is why they were not
subject to executive adjudication.
In any legal system, the role of the courts will depend on the
content of the law. A legal system that does not feature a private
right of reputation, and the rules that constitute such a right, will
not have defamation lawsuits for courts to decide. A legal system
that does not have private rights to government benefits will not
have lawsuits about government benefits, even if the executive is
dispensing them pursuant to rules that create no private rights. In
the nineteenth century system of public rights and private
privileges, the role of the courts depended on choices Congress
made. Congress decided on the executive’s use of public rights and
on private judicial remedies concerning executive decisions.
The older system thus posited an exclusive role for the courts—
one that executive adjudication through the exercise of public rights
did not invade. That role was independently and conclusively to
determine the content of a party’s rights and to change legal
positions pursuant to the law of remedies. Executive officials
administering public rights and affecting private privileges did
neither of those things.
168 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 571–72 (“[A]s American-style separation of powers
developed in the nineteenth century, the respective roles of the branches depended on the
kinds of legal interests that were at stake.”).
169 See id. at 572 (“The political branches controlled purely public rights, and they could
also retain unilateral authority over privileges that they allowed individuals to exercise as
public trusts. When the government wished to take direct and adverse action against
someone's core private rights, however, an exercise of ‘judicial’ power was necessary.”).
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The overall structure of government power posited by the
nineteenth century system did have a role for the courts that was
exclusive for practical purposes and an area where executive and
judicial power overlapped for practical purposes. That area of
practical overlap was defined by Congress’s power in two respects.
When Congress could put the government in the position of an
owner of certain rights, it could provide that executive officials
would exercise ownership rights with no judicial involvement. It
could also give private people judicially enforceable claims against
the government regarding the exercise of the government’s
ownership rights. When it did the former, Congress created the
relation of public right and private privilege. When it did the latter,
it created private rights but in general retained the ability to
withdraw them as to the future.170 The potential scope of public
rights, the exercise of which was not subject to judicially enforceable
duties running to private people, defined Congress’s ability to
choose between executive and judicial decision-making because the
executive power administers public rights.
The nineteenth century system of executive adjudication results
from principles about each of the three powers of government. The
legislative power determines the duties of executive officials
concerning government assets and the rights of private people
against the government. The executive power administers the
assets of the government according to law. The judicial power
decides cases on the basis of law, vindicating legal rights but giving
no relief with respect to interests that are not legally protected. That
system gave to each power its own role, with no exercise by any
institution of another’s power.
IV. THE POTENTIAL SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE ADJUDICATION
This Part will discuss the potential scope of executive
adjudication under the older system. That scope derives from the
basic principle that executive officials adjudicate by administering
the government’s own legal rights pursuant to law. The scope is
170 The government’s ownership interests, over which Congress exercised the authority of
future withdrawal, were “matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such
form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial
determination, but which Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts
of the United States, as it may deem proper.” Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855).
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substantial, mainly for three reasons. First, the government’s legal
rights include the power to grant permissions to engage in
otherwise-prohibited conduct. Second, benefits conferred through
the administration of public rights, including permissions, can be
conditioned on past conduct by private beneficiaries and on
expectations regarding their future conduct. Third, benefits,
including permissions, can be conferred in exchange for a change in
a private party’s legal position—for example, the acceptance of
obligations under a contract.
One implication of the foregoing principles is that executive
officials can perform functions that closely resemble the
determination of disputes between private parties. Oil States is one
example of that arrangement.171
This Part will first consider executive adjudication in which the
interested parties are a private person and the government.172
Then, this Part will turn to the use of public rights to provide for
inter-private adjudication by executive officials.173 The purpose of
this Part is to identify categories of possible executive adjudication
under the older system, not to explore the categories in depth.
A. CASES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS

The administration of public rights and private privileges can be
arranged to create strong incentives regarding private conduct. The
exercise of public rights can therefore operate as a form of
regulation, just as environmental statutes regulate conduct with
the threat of civil penalties and the criminal law regulates conduct
with the threat of fines or imprisonment.
Offering, granting, and withholding federal funds was a classic
use of public rights under the nineteenth century system and is a
central role of the federal government today. Some spending is
conditional but not in a way that is likely to have much effect on
behavior. The prospect of Social Security old-age payments does not
cause aging. Other spending conditions, however, are designed to
and do change incentives regarding conduct. Deciding whether the
conditions have been met thus has effects quite similar to deciding
171 See Oil States Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., L.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1365 (2018) (permitting a form of executive adjudication based on the public nature of the
interests at stake).
172 See discussion infra Section IV.A.
173 See discussion infra Section IV.B.
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whether a criminal law has been complied with. Executive
adjudication concerning the disbursement of federal funds is thus a
powerful form of regulation. Under the nineteenth century system,
it could be done without judicial involvement.
Today, for example, institutions of higher education receive
financial
support
conditioned
on
compliance
with
174
anti-discrimination rules. Violation of those rules can lead the
government to terminate funding.175 The threat of termination is a
powerful incentive, similar to those created by the criminal law.
Under the older system, Congress could give executive officials the
last word in administering the funding statutes, thereby enabling
them to administer a powerful system of rules that influenced
private conduct.176 As the provision of federal funding specifically to
educational institutions shows, that kind of benefit can also be
conditioned on expectations about future conduct such as those
created by the mission of an institution.177
Public rights also include the power to give permission to engage
in conduct that otherwise would conflict with the rights of the public
or the government.178 The current system of broadcast regulation
rests on the premise that, as it is often put, the airwaves are a public
asset that no private person owns.179 Private people thus may not
174 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”). A leading case interpreting that provision involved the University of Chicago,
a recipient of federal funding. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (holding
that the plaintiff, alleging sex discrimination in admission to medical universities, had a
private right of action under that particular provision).
175 The regulations implementing the ban on race discrimination by recipients of federal
funds contemplate termination of funding as one response to racial discrimination. See 45
C.F.R. § 80.8(a) (2018) (“If there appears to be a failure or threatened failure to comply with
this regulation, and if the noncompliance or threatened noncompliance cannot be corrected
by informal means, compliance with this part may be effected by the suspension or
termination of or refusal to grant or to continue Federal financial assistance, or by any other
means authorized by law.”).
176 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 571 (describing the nineteenth century view of
administrative powers).
177 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1138 (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of Education to make grants
to “institutions of higher education” to “improve postsecondary education opportunities”).
178 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 566 (defining public rights).
179 See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to
maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to
provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited
periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be
construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.”). The
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broadcast without permission in the form of a license.180 Grants of
such permission are made by an administrative agency pursuant to
rules Congress establishes.181 Violation of rules applicable to
licensees can lead to suspension of a license.182
Like a private person, the government can obtain additional
rights by contract. For example, in return for their compensation,
federal employees often agree that they will not disclose classified
information that they obtain in connection with their duties.183 That
obligation extends beyond the term of employment itself, and the
government can enforce it through appropriate proceedings.184
The ability to acquire additional rights opens up additional
possibilities for executive adjudication. In Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, the Court applied the nineteenth
century system to uphold a penalty imposed by the executive.185 The
Collector of the Port of New York had assessed a penalty on a
steamship company for failing to comply with health regulations.186
Clearance from the port was conditioned on payment of the
penalty.187 Under the statute, the courts were not involved in the
assessment or collection of the penalty; it was a matter of
“administrative competency.”188 As the Court understood, clearance
was very valuable to the steamship company, so it had strong

statute reiterates the principle that broadcasting is a matter of public and not private right.
See id. § 304 (“No station license shall be granted by the Commission until the applicant
therefor shall have waived any claim to the use of any particular frequency or of the
electromagnetic spectrum as against the regulatory power of the United States because of the
previous use of the same, whether by license or otherwise.”).
180 See id. § 301 (“No person shall use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of
energy or communications or signals by radio . . . except under and in accordance with this
chapter and with a license in that behalf granted under the provisions of this chapter.”).
181 See id. § 303(l) (setting out the authority of Federal Communications Commission to
issue broadcast licenses).
182 See id. § 303(m) (detailing the suspension of licenses).
183 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 508 (1980) (describing Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) employee’s agreement not to disclose classified information).
184 See id. at 513 (enforcing an agreement by former CIA agent not to disclose classified
information without authorization).
185 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
186 See id. at 331–32 (describing the fine to be assessed for bringing an alien into the
country contrary to rules regarding health).
187 See id. (disallowing clearance while fines were unpaid).
188 See id. at 339 (finding that under the statute “the power to refuse clearance to vessels
was lodged for the express purpose of causing both the imposition of the exaction and its
collection to be acts of administrative competency, not requiring a resort to judicial power for
their enforcement”).
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incentives to pay the penalty.189 Aware of the force of that incentive,
the Court approved the system of executive adjudication; clearance
was a privilege, not a right.190 Congress thus could create a form of
executive adjudication by conditioning a benefit on compliance with
the result of that adjudication.
Under the system that the Court endorsed in Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co., the private party involved knew the outcome of the
executive dispute-resolution process. Had the penalty been
$1,000,000, clearance might not have been worth it. The reasoning
of that case suggests that Congress could have gone further. It could
have required, for example, that to be eligible for clearance the
steamship company had to agree to abide by the outcome of the
penalty process. That prior agreement would have given the
government a new legal interest—its contractual right to require
payment of the penalty—that executive officials could have
administered with limited or no judicial involvement. Under an
arrangement of that kind, the steamship company would have had
to decide ex ante whether the benefit of clearance was worth the
potential cost of the penalty.
B. EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES

Oil States involved a dispute between private parties concerning
the validity of a patent. The Court concluded that patents are public
rights for Article III purposes, putting them in the category of
189 See id. at 329 (noting that failure to depart on time would have caused steamship
company “the most serious pecuniary loss consequent on its failure to carry out many other
contracts”).
190 See id. at 339 (discussing several earlier cases that the Court described as holding “that
it was within he competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within
its control, to impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable
money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the
necessity of invoking the judicial power”). One of those earlier cases was Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904), which found complete congressional power, and an absence
of private rights, in the field of foreign commerce:
As a result of the complete power of Congress over foreign commerce, it
necessarily follows that no individual has a vested right to trade with foreign
nations, which is so broad in character as to limit and restrict the power of
Congress to determine what articles of merchandise may be imported into
this country and the terms upon which a right to import may be exercised.
This being true, it results that a statute which restrains the introduction of
particular goods into the United States from considerations of public policy
does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
Id. at 493.
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franchises that Professor Nelson identifies in the nineteenth
century system.191 A franchise is a bundle of legal advantages, given
by the government in pursuit of the public good, that includes rights
as against other private people.
In the nineteenth century system, franchises remained subject to
modification by the government that granted them, absent a
genuine contract to the contrary.192 In the account of that system
presented here, the power to modify franchises is a public right. As
such, it may be exercised by the legislature directly or by the
executive pursuant to law. If the power is given to the executive, the
legislature may decide whether executive decisions are to be
reviewed by the judiciary at the behest of private parties.
When private parties contest the validity of a patent, the power
to revoke the patent if it is found to be invalid is a dispute-resolution
power given to the executive. Oil States thus illustrates one
configuration in which public rights and private privileges can be
arranged so as to support executive adjudication: when the outcome
of the adjudication is itself a change in a private privilege associated
with a government grant. A modern case with elements of the
nineteenth century system, Thomas v. Union Carbide,193 marks
another path by which a combination of rights and privileges can
lead to executive finality. In that case, as in Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co., private access to a privilege was tied to compliance
with resolution of an inter-private dispute by a non-Article III
adjudicator.194
In the statute at issue in Union Carbide, Congress sought to
streamline the process of pesticide registration under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) by allowing
subsequent registrants to rely on scientific data submitted by
previous registrants.195 To deal with the objection that prior
registrants’ proprietary information would be unconstitutionally
taken if it were simply made available to others, Congress provided
that subsequent registrants would have to compensate prior
registrants.196 If the parties were unable to agree on compensation,
their dispute would be arbitrated, with limited judicial review of the
191
192
193
194
195
196

Nelson, supra note 7, at 559.
Id. at 570–71.
473 U.S. 568 (1985).
Id.
Id. at 571–73.
Id. at 573–75.
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arbitrator’s decision.197 The benefit of permission to engage in
regulated conduct—to register pesticides under FIFRA—was the
inducement to enter into the arbitration system, and potential
withdrawal of that benefit was a sanction for failing to comply with
arbitral awards.198 Subsequent registrants had the further
inducement of another government benefit: access to prior
registrants’ data.199 The Court approved the requirement of
arbitration.200 It explicitly left open the question whether arbitral
awards could be directly judicially enforced, or were enforceable
only by loss of access to registration.201 The Court thus recognized,
but did not pass on, the possibility that access to a benefit—
registration under FIFRA—might be used to induce an ex ante
change in legal position that would empower an arbitrator the way
an ordinary contract of arbitration does. The arbitrator in Union
Carbide was another private person.202 Giving arbitral authority to
an executive official would have presented no problem under the
nineteenth century approach, as shown by Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co.203
Both Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. and Union Carbide contain
elements of a system of inter-private executive adjudication based
on the nineteenth century understanding of executive power with
respect to public rights and private privileges. Justice O’Connor
wrote for the Court in Union Carbide as well as in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,204 a case that goes further in
endorsing executive adjudication. Today, that case is a leading
example of anti-formalist reasoning concerning Article III because
Justice O’Connor explicitly rejected a categorical and rule-based
197 See id. at 571–75 (describing the statutory system of registration, submission of data,
compensation by later registrants, and binding arbitration).
198 See id. at 589 (noting that Congress “has the power to condition issuance of registrations
or licenses on compliance with agency procedures”).
199 Id. at 572–73.
200 Id. at 571.
201 Id. at 591–92.
202 See id. at 590 (contrasting “civilian arbitrators” with “agency personnel”).
203 In Union Carbide, the Court described the use of a private arbitrator as a substitute for
a similar arrangement involving only a federal agency. Id. “Congress, without implicating
Article III, could have authorized EPA to charge follow-on registrants fees to cover the cost
of data and could have directly subsidized FIFRA data submitters for their contributions of
needed data.” Id. The use of private arbitrators “collapses these two steps into one” and
“surely does not diminish the likelihood of impartial decisionmaking, free from political
influence.” Id.
204 478 U.S. 833 (1986).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

43

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 5

186

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:143

approach to those issues, instead balancing a number of factors. 205
Despite Justice O’Connor’s rejection of categorical rules, Schor is
readily justified under the nineteenth century system. In important
respects, Justice O’Connor’s reasoning in Schor resembles the
Court’s approach in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., which turned on
access to a privilege administered by the executive. In Schor, as in
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., the Court found that a private party
had consented to agency adjudication.
Schor involved the dispute settlement system that Congress set
up as part of its regulation of commodities brokers. Schor was a
customer of ContiCommodity, a broker.206 As authorized by the
statute, Schor brought a reparations proceeding based on federal
law before a Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), seeking monetary recovery from
ContiCommodity for its alleged statutory violations.207
ContiCommodity had a claim under state law for the unpaid balance
of Schor’s account, which it presented as a counterclaim in the
CFTC proceeding.208 After losing before the CFTC ALJ on both his
claim and ContiCommodity’s counterclaim, Schor argued that the
CFTC lacked statutory authority over the counterclaim.209 When
the CFTC decision came before the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, the court at oral argument raised for the first time the
question of whether the agency could decide the counterclaim, with
only limited judicial review, in light of Article III.210
The Supreme Court found that “Schor indisputably waived any
right he may have possessed to the full trial of Conti’s counterclaim
before an Article III court.”211 He forewent a judicial proceeding on
his claim, to which he was entitled, knowing that the CFTC would
assert jurisdiction over ContiCommodity’s counterclaim and
demanded that ContiCommodity proceed on its counterclaim before

205 The constitutional inquiry, Justice O’Connor wrote, “is guided by the principle that
‘practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should
inform application of Article III.’” Id. at 847–48 (quoting Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 587).
206 Id. at 837.
207 See id. (“In conformance with the congressional goal of promoting efficient dispute
resolution, the CFTC promulgated a regulation in 1976 which allows it to adjudicate
counterclaims ‘aris[ing] out of the transaction or occurrence . . . set forth in the complaint.’”).
208 Id. at 838.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 849.
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the agency.212 Justice O’Connor described that decision as a waiver
of any constitutional right to an Article III tribunal. She also said
that Schor “effectively agreed to an adjudication by the CFTC of the
entire controversy by seeking relief in this alternative forum.”213
The latter formulation makes especially clear how an
arrangement like that in Schor could arise under the older system
of executive adjudication. Parties can by agreement confer on a
third party, like an arbitrator, legal authority to resolve their
dispute and determine the obligations arising out of their
agreement to arbitrate.214 When private people make a contract to
arbitrate, they give one another a right to demand compliance with
the arbitrator’s award.215 They also change the legal relations that
will be the subject of any lawsuit, substantially replacing interests
that would have been subject to adjudication with liability to
arbitration.
The arrangement in Schor thus can be explained as transactions
in which the government acquires a new proprietary interest with
the consent of private parties. That interest is a power to bind
parties the way an arbitrator does. It is acquired in return for a
government benefit. For Schor, the benefit was access to the CFTC
dispute resolution process, which was designed to be less costly than
litigation.216 Once the government acquires a power like a private
arbitrator’s, the executive may exercise that power the way it
exercises any other proprietary right of the government. The
exercise of public rights by the executive thus can produce results
quite similar to the adjudication by a court of a suit between private
parties. Producing those results, however, requires only executive
and not judicial power. Private parties cannot add to the
constitutional powers of government officials, but they can engage
in transactions, like contracts, that give the government new legal
powers in its proprietary capacity.217
Id. at 849–50.
Id. at 850.
214 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (explaining that specified agreements to arbitrate shall be
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” except insofar as subject to revocation as is any
contract).
215 See id. § 9 (explaining the process through which a party may seek judicial confirmation
of an arbitral award).
216 Schor, 478 U.S. at 844 (explaining that CFTC reparations proceedings are designed to
provide an efficient and relatively inexpensive forum for the resolution of disputes).
217 Executive adjudication based on public rights under the older theory thus is not confined
to cases in which the government is a party. Rather, the key question is whether a private
212
213
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The ways in which administration of public rights can be used to
enable executive adjudication are only part of the story. The next
Part turns to the constraints the Constitution puts on Congress’s
ability to establish the relations of public right and private privilege
that underlie that mode of decision making.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON EXECUTIVE ADJUDICATION
BASED ON PUBLIC RIGHTS AND PRIVATE PRIVILEGES
Under the nineteenth century system, Congress can provide for
executive adjudication by creating public rights that can then
operate on private privileges. That does not mean that Congress
may do so just as it pleases. This Part explores the constitutional
constraints that apply when executive adjudication is to be justified
on the older understanding of the relation between executive and
judicial power. Those constraints may arise from the internal limits
on Congress’s enumerated powers, the affirmative restrictions on
those powers, and the structural provisions with which Congress
must comply. Using that typology, this Part identifies possible
sources of constraint and argues that Article III itself is not one. I
seek to set out broad categories, not to list all the particulars that
fall within those categories.
A. INTERNAL LIMITS ON ENUMERATED POWERS

Congress is not an omni-competent legislature, vested with
legislative power that extends to all possible subjects. Rather, the
Constitution gives it only some powers. The principle of enumerated
party has been affected as to a privilege by the exercise of a corresponding public right, and
that question can come up in a dispute between private parties as it did in Oil States Energy
Services, L.L.C. v. Greene’s Energy Group, L.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). Justice Brennan’s
plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. thus erred
in stating that a case involving public rights must arise “between the government and others,”
at least insofar as it referred to the older rationale based on the difference between rights and
privileges. 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982) (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929),
superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, as recognized in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct.
1932 (2015)). For the same reason, and to the same extent, Justice Scalia erred when he
endorsed that principle in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), and the Court was right to reject it in
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985), although
Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court does not fully embrace the nineteenth century
rationale based on rights and privileges.
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congressional power has important implications for Congress’s
ability to provide for executive adjudication by creating relations of
public rights and private privileges. If Congress lacks a power
adapted to that purpose, it cannot create that relationship.
Potential limits of the enumerated powers operate along two
dimensions. One concerns the scope of federal authority; the other
concerns the question of whether any particular authority can bring
about the legal arrangement that underlies executive adjudication
under the older system.
1. Federalism and the Source of Private Rights.
The Court in Northern Pipeline did not produce a majority
opinion.218 Justice Brennan proposed a general scheme, but Justices
Rehnquist and O’Connor found a narrower ground closely connected
to the particular tribunals involved in the case.219 The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 gave the new bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to
hear cases brought by the estate of a bankrupt party against its
creditors.220 As Justice Rehnquist emphasized, those cases did not
involve claims under the Bankruptcy Code or any other federal
law.221 They were ordinary private-law claims mainly founded in
state law.222
A fundamental, sometimes underappreciated, feature of
American federalism is that federal law is interstitial. It operates
only in specific areas.223 Whether that is now true because of the
Constitution or just because of choices Congress has made, it
remains true. In particular, the vast bulk of basic private law is that
of the states.224 As Northern Pipeline illustrates, rights of property
and contract generally are found in state law, as are those of
domestic relations.225
State-law private rights are private for purposes of the
nineteenth century theory of executive adjudication. They have no
N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 89.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (finding a narrower ground than that discussed in the
plurality opinion).
220 Id.
221 Id. at 89–90.
222 Id.
223 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 495 (1954) (describing how, in general, federal law “assumes and accepts” the basic legal
framework created by state law).
224 Id. at 491–92 (discussing how basic private law is state law).
225 Id.
218
219
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component of government ownership; in particular, no component
of federal government ownership. Absent a proprietary-type
interest of the United States, executive officials cannot affect
private people by exercising those interests. Without that predicate,
they cannot make particular decisions under the legal rules
governing public rights.
When the nineteenth century system was developed, that aspect
of American federalism was strong and was seen as based in the
Constitution.226 It therefore represented a substantial restriction on
Congress’s ability to create the relations needed for executive
adjudication. Congress did not make the rules under which private
people became owners, so it could not inject any federal ownership
interest into their legal positions at the outset. Congress chartered
only a few corporations, so most corporate privileges were not
franchises subject to congressional control.227 Federal public rights,
like control over navigation on interstate rivers or of the franchises
of the Banks of the United States, were very much the exception
and not the rule.
Even today, an attempt by Congress to federalize a large area of
private law would be subject to serious constitutional objection. A
federal statute replacing the state law of real property, for example,
with a uniform federal rule would stretch federal power possibly
past its breaking point.228 Today, the U.S. Supreme Court is
concerned with maintaining some limits on congressional power
226 For example, in the Trademark Cases, the Court explained that prior to the passage of
the first Trademark Act by Congress trademarks were created by state law. In re Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). Creation of trademarks, the Court concluded, was not within
Congress’s enumerated powers. Id. Trademarks are not patents or copyrights, and the
Trademark Act was not confined to the use of trademarks in the forms of commerce that
Congress may regulate. Id. at 93–96. Insofar as Congress cannot create a form of property,
intellectual or otherwise, it cannot retain a public right that makes a related private interest
a privilege.
227 After chartering the First and Second Banks of the United States by statutes specific to
them, Congress in the 1860s enacted a series of National Banks Acts, e.g., Act of June 3, 1864,
ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (enacting the National Bank Act of 1864), which were general
incorporations statutes confined to banks. See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191
(chartering the First Bank of the United States); Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266
(creating the Second Bank of the United States). Congress has never adopted a truly general
corporate law that gives federal charters to business corporations without regard to their
purpose.
228 The Court found in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), that a statute punishing
possession of a firearm within a specified distance of a school exceeded Congress’s power
under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. The Court’s decision seems to reflect
a conviction that some line should remain between local and national matters.
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and rejecting the implication that Congress may legislate wherever
it sees fit. A complete federalization of some basic area of private
right would almost certainly be seen as a repudiation of the
principle of enumerated congressional power altogether. Because
Congress is limited in its power to supply the law that establishes
basic private rights, it is limited in its power to provide that those
rights have an element of public ownership in their inception. The
patents at issue in Oil States were an exception to a general
principle about the legal origin of private rights in the constitutional
system.229
2. Creating Relations of Public Right and Private Privilege When
an Enumerated Power Is Available.
Today, as when the older system was dominant, Congress does
have some powers that enable it to establish the United States as a
right-holder and private people as potential recipients of privileges.
Whether any particular power can bring about that result and in
what applications will depend on factors specific to the power and
the application involved.
Congress can create the relationship of public right and private
privilege in two main ways. The first, and more familiar in this
regard, involves powers by which Congress makes private people
better off relative to a baseline of congressional inaction. Grants of
land are an example, and the interest in receiving a land grant was
a well-known privilege in the nineteenth century.230 The second
main way to create that relationship involves powers by which
Congress imposes a general prohibition from which specific
permissions may be carved out.231 Licensing, such as broadcast
licensing, takes the latter form: broadcasting without a license is
forbidden, and a license is a benefit.

229 See generally Oil States Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., L.L.C., 138 S.
Ct. 1365 (2018).
230 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 577 (noting that nineteenth century courts recognized
Congress’s authority to transfer publicly owned land to private individuals).
231 See id. at 571 (explaining how Congress may repeal statutes that create a private
privilege and Congress may revoke or grant the privilege on an individual basis). This
relationship between public rights and private privilege was at work in Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909). There, the Court upheld a statute which
prohibited the transportation of aliens with an infectious disease and directed port officials
to deny clearance papers to companies that violated the statute until a $100 fine was paid.
Id. at 343.
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a. Powers to Grant Benefits.
Today, Congress gives out trillions of dollars in federal funds in
forms that would qualify as privileges under the nineteenth century
system. Social Security benefits are a leading example, and their
constitutionality rests on the contestable conclusion that Congress
may spend federal funds to promote the general welfare.232 The U.S.
Supreme Court’s current position, announced in United States v.
Butler,233 is the so-called Hamiltonian view, according to which
Article I, Section 8 does convey authority to spend for the general
welfare.
Upon embracing the Hamiltonian view, the Court also adopted
an internal limitation that Hamilton himself had adopted: the
welfare to be promoted must be meaningfully general rather than
local.234 While that principle likely has little importance for the
creation of privileges and executive adjudication, another
announced in Butler is important here. The Butler Court
emphasized that the power to spend is not a substitute for powers
to regulate conduct that Congress lacks.235 When Butler was
decided, Congress did not have power to regulate agricultural
production, so the principle had practical significance in that
case.236 While the Court’s more permissive doctrine of congressional
regulatory power has substantially moderated the consequences of
Butler, any internal limits on the spending power that remain are
important for executive adjudication.237 Government spending is a

232 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of
Social Security old-age benefits).
233 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (noting that Congress may spend for the general welfare).
234 Id. at 67 (endorsing the conclusion that spending must be for general and not local
welfare).
235 See id. at 68 (“We are not now required to ascertain the scope of the phrase ‘general
welfare of the United States’ or to determine whether an appropriation in aid of agriculture
falls within it. Wholly apart from that question, another principle embedded in our
Constitution prohibits the enforcement of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The act invades
the reserved rights of the states. It is a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural
production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government. The tax, the
appropriation of the funds raised, and the direction for their disbursement, are but parts of
the plan. They are but means to an unconstitutional end.”).
236 See id. (stating that regulation of agricultural production is “beyond the powers
delegated to the federal government”).
237 In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court concluded that Congress’s powers
to regulate commerce and carry that power into execution enabled it to regulate agricultural
production.
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quintessential public right, and the interest in receiving gratuitous
payments from the government is a quintessential private privilege.
To students of twenty-first century constitutional law, Butler
may seem to present a problem of unconstitutional conditions
similar to those presented by cases like South Dakota v. Dole,238 or
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley.239 In Dole, the Court
assumed that the spending power is subject to an affirmative
limitation found in the independent sovereignty of the states that
protects them from federal coercion.240 In Finley, the spending
power was assumed to be subject to an affirmative limitation
imposed by the First Amendment.241 In both situations, an external
restraint functioned as a limit on an enumerated power. Butler may
appear to be similar, with the external restraint coming from
another aspect of federalism—the states’ retention of regulatory
authority not granted to Congress.
Another way to understand the issue presented in Butler,
however, is that the Court decided a question concerning the reach
of a power. The Court in Butler read the spending power in light of
the larger system of enumerated powers into which it fit.242 The
purposes to which the spending power reaches, Butler suggests, are
to be sought for in light of the limited reach of other powers.243 As
that way of thinking suggests, a power with which benefits can be
conferred can have a principle of unconstitutional conditions built
into it, rather than imposed by another provision that overrides it.

238 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (addressing federal government spending that was conditioned on
state enactment of minimum drinking age).
239 524 U.S. 569, 569 (1998) (deciding questions posed by grants available for works of
artistic excellence with artistic merit).
240 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (“Our decisions have recognized that . . . the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure
turns into compulsion.’” (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937))).
While the Court found that the spending program in Dole was not coercive, id., it concluded
that the Medicaid expansion at issue in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–82 (2012), constituted an impermissible coercion.
241 The Court in Finley considered and rejected the argument that the spending restriction
at issue was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. 524 U.S.
at 580.
242 See 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (“[W]hile, therefore, the power to tax is not unlimited, its
confines are set in the clause that confers it . . . .”).
243 The Court in Butler reasoned that the Agricultural Adjustment Act invaded the
reserved powers of the states because it exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers. Id. at 68.
That way of thinking incorporates aspects of both affirmative restriction and internally
limited power.
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Any limits on the purposes of the spending power are also limits
on executive adjudication. It is plausible, for example, that the
power to spend for the general welfare does not include buying all
the soft drink bottling facilities in the country to bring them under
federal ownership. Congress and the courts have become used to the
idea that the spending power can be used to encourage and
subsidize many forms of activity, such as art in Finley.244 They have
seldom confronted the question whether it can be used to bring some
activity under federal proprietary control. The answer may well in
general be that it may not. If the power is limited along those lines,
so is Congress’s ability to provide for executive adjudication.
Cash grants from the federal government are an important
interest that, under the nineteenth century approach, qualifies as a
privilege. Congress has other powers with which it grants material
benefits. Two are especially notable because they were
well-established features of the constitutional system well before a
general spending power was accepted. The U.S. Constitution
explicitly authorizes Congress to dispose of the territory and other
property of the United States; both land grants and sales were
thoroughly familiar to the framers.245 As Oil States shows, the
power to grant patents is also a central part of congressional
authority, one that has been exercised from the very beginning.246
In the nineteenth century, Congress’s power to condition land
grants was an important tool of policy. States were given lands that
they were expected to sell, with the proceeds going to create and
fund colleges and universities.247 The extent to which the United
States could retain an ownership interest, the way the lessor does
under a lease, depends on an important detail of the power to
dispose of the property of the United States: is a transaction in
244 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587–88 (“[A]lthough the First Amendment certainly has
application in the subsidy context, we note that the Government may allocate competitive
funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or
a criminal penalty at stake. So long as legislation does not infringe on other constitutionally
protected rights, Congress has wide latitude to set spending priorities.”).
245 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (dictating that Congress has power to “dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the
United States”); see also Nelson, supra note 7, at 577 (discussing the nineteenth century
creation of administrative structures to distribute federal lands).
246 Oil States Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., L.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1378
(2018).
247 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–09 (2012) (codifying statutes providing for grants of land to states
to support public universities).
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which an ownership interest is retained a disposition? Very likely it
is. The important point here is to see the question. A power to make
only grants of the fee interest would be importantly restricted.
The possibility that the patent power is restricted to
unconditional grants, with no retained interest, was raised at oral
argument in Oil States.248 An important question in that case was
whether the Constitution requires that patents be once-and-for-all
grants, so that the interest in receiving one is a privilege but a
patent once granted is a right.249 The U.S. Constitution authorizes
Congress to promote science and useful arts “by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.”250 During the argument, Justices
Kennedy and Gorsuch raised the question whether the text’s
reference to securing rights indicates that a patent, once granted,
becomes a private right in the inventor.251 The Court’s opinion, in
which Justice Kennedy joined, concluded that patents remain public
rights once granted.252 In the Court’s view it apparently is possible
to secure a right by giving one that contains an important element
of ongoing public control.
Congressional powers to confer material benefits thus may give
the legislature an all-or-nothing choice or limit it to making grants
in certain forms that do not include an ongoing federal ownership
interest. Whether any such power enables Congress to create the
relation of public rights and private privilege is thus a question
about the content of that power, which may depend on the purpose
it is designed to serve.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16-712).
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1375–78 (discussing the public nature of patent rights).
250 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added) (dictating Congress’s intellectual property
powers).
251 At argument, counsel for respondent, the party supporting adjudication by the Patent
and Trademark Office, suggested that patents are not private rights because they are “not
granted for purposes of the inventor” and that, while they benefit the inventor, “the
paramount public purpose that is imbedded in every patent is the advancement of the
progress of science.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 248, at 39. Justice Gorsuch,
mentioning Justice Story, commented that “once it’s granted, it’s a private right belonging to
the inventor.” Id. Justice Kennedy noted “that’s the constitutional provision” and, after
Justice Gorsuch interjected “yeah,” added “securing for limited times authors and inventors
the exclusive right, securing to them, not securing to the public.” Id. at 39–40.
252 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1375–76 (discussing the public nature of patent rights).
248
249
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b. Regulatory Powers, Prohibitions, and Licensing.
Licenses are benefits, measured against a prohibition on
unlicensed activity. A very early form of federal licensing was in the
first Indian Nonintercourse Act, adopted in 1790.253 Congress
imposed a general prohibition on trade with the Indian tribes.254 It
gave the executive authority to grant licenses for that trade, and
gave the President broad discretion in setting the terms of
licenses.255 The prohibition that made licenses necessary rested on
the Indian commerce power, and was valid only if that power was
broad enough to sustain the general prohibition. Under the
nineteenth century system, licenses were privileges. As such, they
could be granted or denied by the executive pursuant to applicable
rules, with as much or as little judicial involvement as Congress
found appropriate.256
Licenses, and the possibilities for executive adjudication that
come with them, are possible only if Congress has a power with
which to impose a prohibition that makes a license necessary.257 The
first step in deciding whether Congress has such power is to decide
whether Congress may regulate the activity involved at all.258 Only
if rules about radio broadcasting come within one of Congress’s
powers may it regulate broadcasting by imposing a general
prohibition, permission to depart from which requires a license.259
The next step is less familiar: given that Congress may make
rules about some kind of conduct, may it make the rules that
establish a public right and support a licensing system? This kind
of question came before the Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart.260 The
Child Labor Act forbade the transportation in interstate commerce
of goods made with child labor; it did not directly regulate
production.261 A firm could hire all the child laborers it wanted to,
253 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 32, 1 Stat. 137 (prohibiting trade with the Indian tribes absent
a license from the federal government).
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 See Nelson, supra note 7, at 571 (discussing the nineteenth century practice allowing
the legislature to give executive officers the authority to revoke statutorily created privileges
on an individualized basis).
257 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824) (conducting a preliminary
examination as to whether Congress had authority under its commerce power to regulate
maritime navigation before upholding a federal law licensing “vessels in the coasting trade”).
258 Id.
259 See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (banning unlicensed broadcasting).
260 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
261 See id. at 268 n.1 (quoting the Child Labor Act).
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and have them make whatever it wanted, without violating federal
law. The law was designed to be an exercise of the commerce power
proper, not a law necessary and proper to carrying the commerce
power into execution; it was a rule about interstate trade in goods,
which is plainly commerce among the several states.262
Nevertheless, the majority concluded that the Act exceeded
Congress’s power.263 “The act in its effect does not regulate
transportation among the States, but aims to standardize the ages
at which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing
within the States.”264 Making goods and mining coal, the Court said,
“are not commerce, nor does the fact that these things are to be
afterwards shipped, or used in interstate commerce, make their
production a part thereof.”265
Justice Holmes’s answer in dissent addressed the issue that is
relevant to executive adjudication. He rejected any claim that the
power to regulate did not include the power to prohibit.266 He then
argued that the policy principles on which that power was to be
exercised were entirely up to Congress.267 Justice Holmes likely
realized that his reading of the commerce power would support a
licensing system. He almost certainly was aware that it would
support executive adjudication. His Court had held that executive
decisions regarding the exclusion of aliens could be made absolutely
final because Congress had complete control over the admission of
aliens, who had no right to enter the country.268 Plenary power

262 See id. at 217 (“The thing intended to be accomplished by this statute is the denial of
the facilities of interstate commerce to those manufacturers in the States who employ
children within the prohibited ages.”).
263 Id. at 276.
264 Id. at 271–72.
265 Id. at 272 (citing Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U.S. 439
(1915)).
266 Id. at 277–78 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“It would not be argued today that the power to
regulate does not include the power to prohibit. Regulation means the prohibition of
something, and when interstate commerce is the matter to be regulated I cannot doubt that
the regulation may prohibit any part of such commerce that Congress sees fit to forbid.”).
267 See id. at 280–81.
268 See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659–60 (1892) (holding that
Congress may admit aliens on such conditions as it sees fit, may authorize courts to
investigate facts concerning their eligibility to enter the country, or may entrust “final
determination” of facts to executive officers).
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supported executive adjudication in a regime of public right and
private privilege.269
Any regulatory power that can be used for any purpose Congress
chooses can support licensing with executive adjudication. If
Congress may impose a prohibition for any reason, it may impose a
prohibition for the reason of putting the government in the position
of a property owner for purposes of the activity in question. Even a
power that is not that sweeping can sometimes support executive
adjudication. Two licensing systems, one old and one new, provide
examples. Congress in the 1790s might well have concluded that
disputes related to trade could disrupt peaceful relations with the
Indian tribes, at a time when maintaining peace was vital to
national security. Keeping the peace would have been a legitimate
use of the Indian commerce power.270 Under those circumstances,
subjecting the Indian trade to very close federal regulation by
banning it, subject to licensing, was a way to foster pacific relations.
Similar reasoning justifies the licensing system involved in
Thomas v. Union Carbide.271 Pesticides can be hazardous, shipping
them poses serious risks, and Congress is charged with regulating
interstate shipment in general. Extensive regulation is a reasonable
step.272 When the problem is risk, licensing has an important
advantage. The requirement of a license is itself easily enforced, and
completely excludes unlicensed operators. No inquiry into the risks
they pose is necessary. More complicated rules designed to deal with
risk, and the enforcement efforts that those rules may call for, can
be concentrated on licensed operators.
Licensing commerce puts the government in the position of an
owner, with a right to exclude and a power to give permission. The
Indian Nonintercourse Act and FIFRA may not look like federal
ownership, but they function much like intellectual property, giving
one party the right that some specified conduct not take place

269 See id. at 660 (“[A]nd in such a case . . . in which a statute gives a discretionary power
to an [executive] officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, he is
made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.”).
270 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (arguing that a single national government, in its
dealings, would be less likely to provoke the Indian tribes than a multitude of state
governments).
271 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
272 See id. at 589 (noting that Congress has the power, under Article I, to condition the
issuance of licenses on compliance with agency procedures under a complex regulatory
scheme).
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without its permission.273 The current system of broadcast
regulation reflects a choice of public, rather than private, ownership
of an intangible asset that is a crucial input to an important
business.274 Any time Congress seeks to create that form of
regulation, the constitutional question is whether its control over
the activity involved extends to creating what amounts to public
ownership. Whether any particular regulatory power is capable of
creating relations of public right and private privilege in that
fashion depends on the purposes to which the power may be put.275
B. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND EXECUTIVE ADJUDICATION

Internal limits on congressional power remain an important part
of constitutional doctrine, but today they likely take second place to
affirmative limitations. Those limitations too can restrict
Congress’s ability to create relations of public right and private
privilege, and so restrict its ability to provide for executive
adjudication on the rationale of the nineteenth century system. This
273 The Patent Act provides that patents “shall have the attributes of personal property.”
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). Patent holders have a right against infringement, which is a
statutorily defined kind of act that harms the patentee’s interest in the patent but does not
consist of physical interference with an object the patentee owns. Id. § 271 (defining
infringement as making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing into the United States
any patented invention).
274 See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (providing for private use but not ownership of the channels
of radio transmission). Public ownership with licensing to private operators is not the only
way to manage the scarcity of radio frequencies. Another is private property. See R. H. Coase,
The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–17 (1959) (discussing “the
idea of using private property and the pricing system in the allocation of frequencies”).
275 The Court has recently found some limits on Congress’s power to condition access to
interstate commerce. In Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015), the Court
found that a requirement that raisin growers transfer a specified portion of their crop to a
federal raisin reserve constituted a taking of property that required just compensation. The
Court rejected the argument that Congress could condition permission to engage in commerce
on agreeing to limit sales in that fashion. Id. at 2430. Its opinion distinguished regulation of
the sale of pesticides, as in Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568 (1985), from regulation of
the sale of raisins:
Selling produce in interstate commerce, although certainly subject to
reasonable government regulation, is similarly not a special government
benefit that the Government may hold hostage to be ransomed by the waiver
of a constitutional protection. Raisins are not dangerous pesticides; they are
a healthy snack.
Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2430–31. Exactly what principle of unconstitutional conditions the Court
meant to rely on is hard to say. It may be that Congress’s regulatory power over harmful
substances is greater than its regulatory power over healthful snacks, or that a condition that
requires surrender of personal property is impermissible.
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survey of potential limits on executive adjudication is designed to
identify categories of relevant constitutional limitations. For that
reason, it is organized, not by particular limitations like the First
Amendment, but by the ways in which the Constitution restricts the
steps Congress might take to create the legal relations needed for
executive adjudication.
1. Limitations Protecting Freedom of Conduct and Choice.
Licenses are an important form of private privilege, and they
relieve their holders from prohibitions. Therefore, constitutional
limitations that inhibit prohibitions on conduct also limit
licensing.276 Affirmative limitations that affect the congressional
powers used for licensing are not so easy to find, however. The U.S.
Constitution secures U.S. citizens substantial freedom to move
throughout the United States.277 It does not secure liberty to
transport unregistered rodenticides from state to state. Congress
may not ban and license religious worship as such, but that
constitutional principle is not likely to restrict any system of
executive adjudication that Congress is likely to adopt. No
affirmative limitation operates generally in favor of freedom to
engage in interstate commerce, so much of the executive
adjudication that could rest on licensing commerce is not limited by
constitutional protections of liberty of conduct. One possible
exception to that generalization is both important and illustrative
of the difficulties that can arise in this context: regulation of
broadcasting.
As discussed above, the current system of broadcast regulation
rests on a form of public ownership: liberty to broadcast, which is
the use of an intangible asset, is generally restricted, and allowed
only with a license. That arrangement puts the government in the
position of owner of the intangible asset, and private people in the
position of someone with a revocable permission to use another’s
property. Broadcasting is regularly used for communication, and,
for that reason, broadcasting facilities bear a functional
resemblance to printing presses. A general ban on broadcasting
276 By a constitutional protection of freedom of conduct, I mean a rule like the First
Amendment, which protects particular activities like speech. Protection of liberty in the sense
of freedom of movement, so-called natural liberty, is dealt with later. See discussion infra
Section IV.B.2.b.
277 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (finding that the right to travel throughout
the country is rooted in the U.S. Constitution).
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thus may seem like a straightforward violation of the First
Amendment, and a system of licensing may seem like a classic and
straightforward violation.278 But the freedom of the press does not
entail liberty to use printing facilities that are owned by the
government any more than it entails liberty to use printing facilities
owned by another private person. American constitutional liberty is
negative in that its extent depends on the resources that private
people command, whether those resources be a meeting hall or a
newspaper.279 Whether the First Amendment limits Congress’s
power to establish a regime of complete or partial public ownership
of an important medium of communication—the liberty to
broadcast—is a difficult question. Because rules about ownership of
resources are in an important sense prior to rules about freedom of
speech and press, that question is not answered by the fact that a
ban on unlicensed broadcasting is to some extent a ban on
unapproved communication.
Because constitutional protections of liberty are generally
negative in that they take for granted the rules that determine
private parties’ control over resources, it may often be the case that
a constitutional protection of liberty does not constrain Congress’s
ability to create a system of public rights and private privileges.
That is not to say that affirmative restrictions in favor of liberty of
conduct never impose such constraints, but it does mean that
Congress may well have substantial scope to create the
preconditions for executive adjudication even when constitutional
liberty is at issue.
2. Constitutional Protections of Life, Natural Liberty, and
Property.
When Congress imposes a general ban on some conduct and
provides for licenses to engage in that conduct, it puts the
278 Rejection of licensing has long been a leading feature of the Anglo-American concept of
freedom of the press. See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE
L.J. 409, 412–13 (1983) (discussing press licensing as classic violation of freedom of the press).
279 In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court held
unconstitutional a Florida statute that required newspapers to print replies by candidates
for office to comments the newspaper made about them. The Court found that the statute
restricted the newspaper’s freedom of speech, even though it was designed to facilitate speech
by candidates. Underlying Tornillo is the assumption that freedom of speech is freedom to
use one’s own resources, not those of another. See Lillian R. BeVier & John Harrison, The
State Action Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1820–21 (2010) (exploring the
connection between negative constitutional rights and private property).
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government in a position like that of an owner. Sometimes the
government acts to acquire ownership rights in a more familiar
sense, as when it acquires real estate. The U.S. Constitution limits
Congress’s power to acquire ownership. It does so in familiar
restrictions concerning unconsented acquisitions of property. It also
does so in the less familiar but basic context of physical control over
individuals’ persons. Such control is found in the rights to life and
to freedom of movement—the latter often called natural liberty to
distinguish it from liberty to engage in some form of conduct like
religious worship. Insofar as the U.S. Constitution limits Congress’s
power to make the government an owner, it limits Congress’s power
to provide for executive adjudication.
a. Property.
In several ways, the U.S. Constitution protects private interests
that are or closely resemble private property. Today’s constitutional
doctrine limits government in favor of both private property and
government benefits that are similar to it, although those
limitations are not identical as to the two kinds of private interest.
Insofar as the U.S. Constitution limits Congress’s control over the
property-like interests of private persons, it may also limit
Congress’s ability to create the relation of public right and private
privilege that underlies executive adjudication in the nineteenth
century system.
i. Private Property and Takings.
The most familiar way in which Congress can establish public
ownership is to acquire title to, or an interest in, an existing asset.
When Congress directs the executive to purchase real estate, that
real estate can be administered as a public right by the executive.
Purchases with federal funds are limited by any internal limits on
the spending power. Acquisition through eminent domain or direct
legislative action is subject to affirmative limitations.
As Nelson explains, nineteenth century courts distinguished
between franchises and what he calls core private rights, like basic
rights of property and contract.280 Franchises, like a monopoly to
operate a bank or a bridge, were given by the government for public
purposes and subject to change by the government; they did not

280

Nelson, supra note 7, at 566–68.
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become vested rights. Core private rights, by contrast, originated
with no element of public ownership, because they were seen as
analogs in civil society of rights that would exist without
government.281 Once core private rights arose, they were vested and
protected against divestment by legislative action.282 Combined,
those principles meant that the rights known to the private law
arose as private and not public, and the government could not make
them wholly or partly public. Because executive adjudication was
possible only with respect to public and not private rights, only the
courts could adjudicate with respect to the latter.
That limit on Congress’s power to create relations of public right
and private privilege no longer operates. While Lockean theories of
the content of the private law remain important, no such theory can
today be confidently assumed in understanding existing legal rules.
Two important features of the current constitutional system,
however, combine to impose important limits on Congress’s ability
to use public rights to support executive adjudication.
The first is federalism. Congress may be able to arrange the law
governing patents so that a patent originates with a component of
public ownership. In similar fashion, Congress may be able to retain
a reversionary interest for the United States when it grants federal
real estate. As long as private rights are generally found in state
and not federal law, however, Congress cannot keep those rights
from having no component of federal ownership when they first
arise. Whether under current doctrine Congress could federalize the
private law is, as noted above, quite doubtful, even in light of the
broad powers that doctrine endorses.283 Until Congress takes such
a drastic step, private rights will mainly be state-law rights and so
will come into existence without any aspect of public ownership, or
at least federal public ownership. The federal structure thus
performs the function that the Lockean conception of private rights
performed in the older system.284
281 See id. (discussing the difference between core private rights and franchises in their
relation to the Lockean state of nature).
282 In Corwin’s phrase, the principle that the legislature could not simply take property by
decree was the basic doctrine of American constitutional law, the foundation of what today
would be called substantive due process. See Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of
American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247, 247–48 (1914) (noting that protection of
vested rights of property was a fundamental principle of antebellum constitutional law).
283 See discussion supra Section V.A.1.
284 As far as executive adjudication is concerned, the crucial aspect of the older system was
that core private rights were private and not public. How that came to be was not critical.
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Second, although constitutional protections of private property
are not as robust as they were when the nineteenth century system
of executive adjudication prevailed, the Takings Clause still has
considerable force.285 Any attempt by Congress to acquire public
ownership of existing assets without payment would run afoul of it.
Straightforward acquisition of title would constitute a taking under
any interpretation of the Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court has been
notoriously unable to explain when a regulation of the use of
property goes so far that it qualifies as a taking under the Clause.286
The difficulties the Court has encountered would not arise were
legislation to be predicated on acquisition of ownership by the
government, as it would have to be to support executive
adjudication under the older system.287 It is hard to see how
Congress could simultaneously claim to have established public
ownership for purposes of Article III and, at the same time, claim
not to have acquired private property for public use for purposes of
the Takings Clause.
ii. Government Benefits and Requirements of Judicial Review.
In recent decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has treated
government benefits—so-called “new property”—the way it treats
ordinary private property for purposes of many substantive
constitutional norms.288 By doing so, the Court has rejected an older
approach, according to which adverse government decisions
285 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”). The Clause remains a significant limitation on government power,
despite the decline in judicial protection of property rights as compared to the nineteenth
century. For an example of the Clause’s continued vitality, see Horne v. Department of
Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
286 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (“The
question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be
a problem of considerable difficulty. While this Court has recognized that the ‘Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole,’ . . . this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for
determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action
be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on
a few persons.” (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))).
287 The Court’s famously unclear statement that “if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking” assumes the far end of the spectrum that clearly constitutes a taking
is acquisition of ownership. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
288 See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990) (holding that freedom
of expression protections limit the government’s power to condition public employment on
partisan affiliation).
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regarding benefits did not violate affirmative limitations like the
First Amendment. While on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, then-Judge Holmes provided a famous formulation
of the older principle: a police officer could be fired for political
activity, even though he could not have been jailed for it, because
although he might have a right to talk politics, he had no right to be
a policeman.289 In its capacity as employer, the government could
act on grounds forbidden to it as sovereign by acting on the privilege
of public employment.
Executive adjudication concerning public benefits raises a
related question, one having to do with the structure of government
and, in particular, access to court. Constitutional limitations fit
smoothly into a system of litigation devised for ordinary private
rights. For example, if the government seeks to punish a private
person through a criminal prosecution, constitutional objections to
the legal rule being enforced come before the court.290 When
government officials inflict or threaten private harm in the course
of their official activities, affected parties can test the limits of their
authority by asserting their private rights against the officials.291
The rules concerning access to judicial remedies that come with the
289 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892), abrogated by O’Hare
Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996). A New Bedford police officer had
solicited a political contribution in violation of a municipal regulation forbidding police
officers to do so. Then-Judge Holmes wrote:
[T]here is nothing in the constitution or the statute to prevent the city from
attaching obedience to this rule as a condition to the office of policeman, and
making it part of the good conduct required. The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.
Id. at 517. A few years later, then-Judge Holmes took the same approach to the government’s
rights as property owner that he took to its rights as employer. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39
N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895). In that case, Davis was convicted of making a public speech on the
Boston Common without a permit. Id. at 113. Upholding the conviction, then-Judge Holmes
wrote:
As representative of the public, [the government] may and does exercise
control over the use which the public may make of such places . . . . For the
Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway
or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the
public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.
Id. at 113.
290 See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (finding that the criminal
defendant successfully raised a First Amendment objection to the Flag Protection Act).
291 See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (holding
that a public official who threatens to invade private rights without justification is subject to
an injunction).
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private right involved bring any constitutional questions before the
judiciary.
Matters concerning access to judicial remedies are more
complicated with respect to government benefits. A central principle
of the older system of executive adjudication was that Congress
could give executive officials the task of dispensing benefits without
creating any judicially-enforceable private rights.292 Absent such a
right, a private person claiming to have been damaged by an
unconstitutional feature of the benefit program would have no way
to bring the issue before a court. The problem was compounded,
although not created, by sovereign immunity. A judicial order to
confer a benefit would run against the United States, not against an
official personally, and would be barred without the sovereign’s
consent.293
If Justice Holmes’s approach to substantive constitutional
limitations and public benefits applied across the board, the second
question would not arise. No exercise of the government’s rights as
proprietor, and hence no decision not to give a benefit, would run
afoul of constitutional protections of liberty of conduct. The U.S.
Supreme Court has long rejected Justice Holmes’s view, and its
doctrine today contemplates that a decision not to grant a benefit
may be unconstitutional.294
The Court has, to some extent, assimilated government benefits
to private property for purposes of substantive constitutional
limitations. It has not systematically worked out the implications of
that way of treating benefits for access to court. The Court has,
however, expressed doubts about the constitutionality of precluding
judicial review of constitutional questions concerning benefits like
employment.295 If judicial involvement is constitutionally required
when the U.S. Constitution limits Congress’s power concerning the
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part III.
294 See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (finding that a restriction
on the use of federal funds by the Legal Services Corporation was unconstitutional under the
First Amendment).
295 In Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988), the question was whether a statute precluded
judicial review, within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, over the decision to
fire a CIA employee. The Court concluded that judicial review was precluded with respect to
the employee’s statutory claims, but not his constitutional claim. Id. at 601, 603–04 (“Nothing
in [the relevant provision] persuades us that Congress meant to preclude consideration of
colorable constitutional claims arising out of the actions of the Director pursuant to that
section.”).
292
293
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government’s proprietary-type rights, then, for one reason or
another, the nineteenth century principles concerning executive
adjudication do not apply.
Because the Court has not much adumbrated the grounds for
thinking that judicial involvement may sometimes be mandatory
when benefits are involved, it is not clear how to fit any such
requirement into the framework of the older system of executive
adjudication. One way to do so is to say that when the Constitution’s
substantive limitations operate on the government in its
proprietary capacity, they create private legal interests that
function as private rights.296 That account has considerable appeal.
A public right is one as to which the legislature has discretion, as a
private owner does. When the Constitution limits that discretion,
the conditions for a public right are not met.297 Constitutional
limitations in favor of liberty of conduct operate in favor of private
people, as is reflected in their description as constitutional rights. If
a right is held by a private person, it is not held by the public.
b. Life and Natural Liberty.
In general, individuals have legally protected interests with
respect to their persons. Physical invasions of bodily integrity and
physical restraints are largely unlawful.298 Bodily integrity and
freedom of movement, the latter often called natural liberty to
distinguish it from freedom to engage in particular forms of conduct
like speech, are private rights. For Congress to subject those
interests to public ownership would be a step too drastic to describe
in legal terms. A law along those lines might, for example, prohibit
people from leaving their dwelling places without government
permission. That would make freedom of movement a privilege and
not a right. Just how the courts would respond is very difficult to
296 To preserve the principle that Congress in general retains discretion as to whether to
create benefits at all, it may be slightly better to say that substantive constitutional
limitations operate to restrict Congress’s power to arrange a program so that it creates no
private rights, while Congress retains the discretion to decide whether to have such a
program at all.
297 The nineteenth century approach to benefits and substantive limitations, exemplified
in then-Judge Holmes’s opinions, may rest on the converse reasoning: when the government
acts as a proprietor, the U.S. Constitution does not limit its discretion. See cases cited supra
note 289.
298 See Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (“At common law, even
the touching of one person by another without consent and without legal justification was a
battery.”).
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say, in part because it is difficult to imagine their reaction to
circumstances that might lead Congress to adopt such a law. It is
easier to say that the vast bulk of judges today if presented with a
law like that as a hypothetical would say the law is
unconstitutional, although they might differ as to the reason. The
reason might involve the Due Process Clause, but the result is more
easily predicted than the grounds for it.299
If life and natural liberty as private rights have substantial
substantive constitutional protection, Congress’s ability to make
those interests the subject of public rights is substantially
restricted. The conclusion that Congress’s power is restricted in
such a way has implications, not just for the unlikely possibility of
legislation making bodily integrity and freedom of movement into
public rights, but perhaps more importantly for understanding the
view that the courts’ special role is to protect life, liberty, and
property. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires
due process for deprivations of life, liberty, or property, and in the
nineteenth century due process was routinely equated with judicial
process.300 According to the explanation of the older system
presented in this Article, the concept of judicial power gives the
courts no special connection to any particular kind of legal rule or
legal right. All rights are treated the same, including public rights
that are exercised by the executive and that have effects on private
people.
As to property, the association of the courts with those three
categories is readily reconciled by the principle that all rules are the
same as far as the scope of judicial power goes. Property means
private property, and public rights end where private property

299 In Cruzan, the Court found in its prior cases “a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.” Id. at 278. The Court’s response to the
quite limited invasion involved in involuntary medical treatment suggests that there would
be a stronger response to an attempt by Congress to make those basic private rights into
public rights. A more natural source for the principle of self-ownership might be the
Thirteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (forbidding slavery and involuntary
servitude).
300 See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation
of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012) (noting that the due process clauses require that
legislatures act generally and prospectively, whereas courts act specifically and
retrospectively); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA.
L. REV. 493, 506–09 (1997) (discussing how direct legislative deprivations were seen as being
without due process because legislatures do not act on the basis of existing law like courts
do).
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begins. With respect to life and liberty, the association of courts with
those interests can also be explained in simply definitional terms. If
the Due Process Clause refers to the specific private rights of life
and liberty found in the positive law, rather than the non-legal
interests in life and liberty the law protects, then like other private
rights they are not subject to executive adjudication. That
conclusion follows, however, not because courts have a special role
in protecting the interests in life and liberty, but because their
function is to protect all rights found in the positive law.
As the likely unconstitutionality of legislation transforming life
and liberty into public rights suggests, the principle that courts
protect life and liberty may also arise from substantive
constitutional protections of life and liberty. Insofar as the U.S.
Constitution secures private rights concerning those interests, it
prevents the change in legal relations that underlies executive
adjudication with respect to them: if substantively protected, life
and liberty cannot be made privileges subject to public rights. With
executive adjudication ruled out, the only way the government can
operate on the interests involved is through the sole institution that
can change private rights by applying the law of remedies: the
judiciary. Once again, the courts’ exclusive role results, not from a
principle concerning the judicial power, but from limitations on the
legislative power and a resulting limitation on the functions that
can be assigned to the executive.301
C. ARTICLE III AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT

The constitutional structure can operate as an external limit on
congressional power because Congress must work through that
structure, and individuals are sometimes said to have rights as a
result. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is
formulated as an affirmative restriction and concerns the
decision-making processes of government.

301 Although the government does not have and probably cannot have an owner’s control of
the bodily integrity and natural liberty of private people, matters are different with respect
to members of the armed forces. They have a general obligation to go where they are told and
risk their lives if necessary. A group of 300 soldiers, for example, might be ordered to hold a
pass at all costs. The legal relations between the government and members of the armed
forces raises the possibility that courts martial can be justified as executive adjudication
concerning public rights. I will not explore that possibility in this Article.
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1. Rights to Judicial Hearings under Article III and
Unconstitutional Conditions.
According to the explanation of the older system presented here,
the allocation of responsibility between the executive and the
judiciary did not reflect the principle that only courts could
adjudicate finally with respect to core private rights. Rather, that
allocation resulted from the executive’s ability to administer public
rights and the actual allocation of interests between public and
private control. That allocation of interests reflected both choices
the legislature had made, and the limits on the choices it was
allowed to make. If Congress had the power to provide for some
public benefit with or without judicial involvement in its
distribution, and chose not to involve the courts, executive officials
would in effect have the last word. If Congress created a private
right against the government, the courts would enforce it. If
Congress could not or did not establish a relationship of public right
and private privilege, the courts would enforce private rights just as
they enforce all rights.
Under that interpretation of the older system, Article III’s grant
of judicial power to the courts does not identify any interest that
must be the subject of decision by the courts. Article III, however,
might be thought to impose a limitation on Congress’s ability to
create public rights because it creates a right to adjudication by the
federal courts and limits Congress’s ability to condition receipt of
benefits on waiver of that right. Justice O’Connor raised that
possibility in Schor, when she concluded that Schor had “waived any
right [he] may have possessed to the full trial of [ContiCommodity’s]
counterclaim before an Article III court.”302 Her formulation does
not entail that Schor had such a right but does show how it is
possible to think in terms of one and waiver of one. The principle
that some conditions on benefits are unconstitutional means that
some demands for waivers are impermissible.
To apply the concept of waiver of a right to the identification of
an unconstitutional condition, it is necessary to describe the right
correctly. Under the older system of executive adjudication, Article
III certainly did not create a right that all decisions applying law to
fact be made by courts. Nor did it create a right that all functionally

302

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 US. 833, 849 (1986).
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final decisions be made by courts. Executive exercises of public
rights could in effect be final, although their finality did not come
from any preclusive effect such as a judicial judgment had.
According to the interpretation of the older system presented here,
Article III uniquely empowered the courts it created to apply the
primary and remedial law independently and conclusively to
disputes before them. Whether any specific dispute was before them
depended on the content of the primary law, including the pattern
of public and private rights that law established.
So understood, Article III gives private people a right to
adjudication of their rights by courts. It does not determine what
their rights are. As a result, Article III does not create any right to
a judicial determination that is independent of the arrangement of
rights established by the primary law. In the absence of a
constitutional right, no problem of unconstitutional conditions
arises. If a private person and the government enter into a
transaction that is otherwise permissible given Congress’s
enumerated powers and the affirmative limits on them besides
Article III, the role of the federal courts will reflect the result of that
transaction. When Schor consented to CFTC adjudication of his
claim and ContiCommodity’s counterclaim, he changed his primary
legal relations.303 In return for the benefits of administrative
dispute resolution, he became liable to an exercise of a power
conferred on the CFTC with his consent, a power to create
obligations to ContiCommodity, or in his favor should he prevail.
When private people rearrange their legal positions with respect to
one another and the government, their new positions have new
consequences for judicial involvement. The Article III courts will
enforce the rights they have after that rearrangement just as they
enforced the rights that existed before. Because Article III looks to
legal rules, rather than non-legal interests, any right it creates runs
to the enforcement of whatever legal rights a person already has.
2. Procedural Due Process and Executive Adjudication.
In today’s doctrine concerning executive adjudication, the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment enters at two points. First,
it imposes certain procedural requirements on executive decision
making when the decisions involved constitute deprivations of life,

303

Id.
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liberty, or property as those concepts are used in the doctrine. The
exact procedural requirements—the process that is due—vary
depending on the private and governmental interests at stake.304
Second, like Article III, the Due Process Clause may require some
judicial involvement with respect to some deprivations.305
In the nineteenth century system, the Due Process Clause
worked differently. Only courts could give due process, so
deprivations by the executive were categorically forbidden.306 That
was not a problem for executive adjudication, because the lawful
exercise of a public right did not deprive anyone of a private right.
The modern doctrine of procedural due process is thus probably not
consistent with the assumptions of the older system about the Due
Process Clause. According to today’s procedural due process
doctrine, executive officials can effect deprivations of life, liberty, or
property with due process of law, and any deprivations they bring
about must come with due process.307 Today’s procedural due
process cases are thus inconsistent with one feature of the older
system. Under the nineteenth century approach, Congress had
complete control over the procedures the executive used in
exercising public rights, just as it had complete control over judicial
supervision of executive decisions. The contemporary Court rejected
the older system when it rejected the argument that the process due
for deprivation of rights created by statute is the process set out in
the statute.308
304 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976) (articulating the now-standard
formulation of the test with which executive decision making is evaluated for compliance with
the procedural aspect of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
305 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 447–48 (1944) (concluding that the
limited form of judicial review provided by the emergency price control system of World War
II was consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). The Court upheld
the statutory system and so perhaps did not, strictly speaking, hold that due process required
some judicial involvement, but its inquiry shows that the question of whether it did was a
serious one. Id.
306 See sources cited supra note 300 (pointing to equation of due process with judicial
process in nineteenth century).
307 The premise of the inquiry in Mathews, for example, was that denial of disability
benefits constituted a deprivation of property. 424 U.S. at 341–42; see also Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 261–63 (1970) (discussing the termination of benefits as a deprivation of
property under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
308 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (concluding that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prescribes minimum procedures for
termination of public employment). The Court in Loudermill rejected the view of a plurality
of Justices in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), according to which the government’s
power to define the substance of rights it creates, like the rights of public employees, brings
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Current procedural due process doctrine can be reconciled with
the nineteenth century system’s principles regarding the role of the
courts as long as the requirement of due process is confined to the
decisional processes of executive officials and does not include
access to the judiciary as part of due process. Compliance with
procedural requirements found in the Constitution could be made a
prerequisite for the validity of executive exercises of public rights as
against private privileges. Procedural requirements imposed on the
executive are consistent with finality as far as the courts are
concerned for decisions that followed the required procedure. Such
a system, combining older and newer parts of due process concepts,
would need a reading of the Due Process Clause that could
accommodate it. One reading along those lines would give both
deprivation and due process different applications to the executive
as opposed to the courts. For the executive, deprivations would
include some exercises of public rights with adverse effects on
private interests that are not rights, and due process would consist
of some decisional method designed to enable correct decision
making. For the courts, deprivations would consist of adverse acts
with respect to rights, not privileges, and due process would be the
familiar accoutrements of the judicial way of doing business.
VI. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The Court’s renewed interest in a reading of Article III that
focuses on private rights is part of a broader skepticism among some
justices, judges, and commentators concerning the constitutional
underpinnings of contemporary administrative government. Just as
agencies are accused of exercising judicial power by resolving some
disputes, so agencies are accused of doing so when they receive

with it the power to define the procedures under which those rights may be terminated. 470
U.S. at 539–41.
[The] Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights—life,
liberty, and property—cannot be deprived except pursuant to
constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance and
procedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced
to a mere tautology. “Property” cannot be defined by the procedures provided
for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty.
Id. at 541. Loudermill thus rejected the older system. Id.
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so-called Chevron deference.309 Chevron, according to one standard
reading, calls on courts to defer to agency interpretations of the
law.310 Justice Thomas has challenged any such deference on the
grounds that it invades the constitutional role of the courts, who are
to interpret the law for themselves.311 Recent years have also seen
renewed interest in the problem of delegation of legislative power to
executive agencies. The criticism is that just as only courts are
allowed to decide disputes, only Congress may make and change
legal rules because only Congress has legislative power.312
In the current debate over Article III, the approach that focuses
on the categories of public and private rights is associated with a
more restrictive view of administrative government. Justice
Thomas, the principal advocate of a restrictive view, wrote for the
Court in Oil States and focused on the status of patents as private
rights.313 Justice Breyer, who does not adopt a restrictive stance,
denies that executive adjudication is necessarily impermissible
when private rights are at stake.314 In his dissent in Stern v.
Marshall, Justice Breyer rejected both the majority’s restrictive
conclusion regarding adjudication by bankruptcy courts and the
majority’s categorical methodology taken from Justice Brennan’s
plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline.315
The older system of executive adjudication, with its distinctions
between private and public rights and private rights and privileges,
relied on categories. Courts enforced rights, and privileges were, by
definition, not legally protected. That system came from a time of
much smaller government. I have argued that it can readily be
explained with a conception of the judicial power that does not itself
affect the status of interests as rights or privileges. The
constitutional rules that determine whether Congress may create

309 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(stating that courts are to defer to reasonable agency constructions of statutes that the agency
administers).
310 Id. at 844 (discussing the impact of Chevron on agency deference).
311 See, e.g., Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that judicial power requires that courts exercise independent judgment in
interpreting law).
312 See id. at 2712–13 (claiming that agency law-making invades legislative power vested
in Congress by Article I).
313 Oil States Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., L.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
314 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 512 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
315 Id. at 506.
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the relationship of public right and private privilege come from
elsewhere.
Perhaps even more striking is that today’s understandings of the
scope of congressional power support a broad scope of executive
adjudication under the older system. Where Congress may forbid
and then license an activity, it has the tools to create relations of
public right and private privilege. The broad power over economic
activity that Congress enjoys under prevailing understandings of its
constitutional authority enables it to regulate in that mode across
many contexts. As Thomas v. Union Carbide indicates, health,
safety, and the environment are leading examples. Indeed, licensing
the interstate transport of pesticides does not even require an
expansive reading of the commerce and necessary and proper
powers. It requires only that Congress’s power over actual
interstate transportation of goods be as broad as Justice Holmes
said it was in his dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart.316 Regulation of
interstate financial activities through licensing goes back, not just
to the nineteenth, but to the eighteenth century. The First Bank of
the United States received a franchise—permission to conduct
banking activities throughout the country—that was a privilege
under the nineteenth century system.317 Around the time it
chartered the First Bank, Congress imposed a licensing
requirement on all transactions falling within one of the three heads
of its commerce power.318
One implication of the reasoning presented in this Article is that
the independent constraining effect of separation of powers on
administrative government is less than some may think. The
principle that only courts may adjudicate as to private rights
reaches as far as private rights. How far private, as opposed to
public, rights reach is to some extent up to the legislature. Some
proponents of separation of powers as a protection of private
interests might be disappointed with that conclusion, but it is an
inherent limitation of government structure as a mode of constraint.
Powers of government are to a large extent trans-substantive. That
gives them force because they operate in all substantive contexts.
316 See 247 U.S. 251, 277–78 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (commenting on the scope of
Congress’s power with respect to interstate transportation of goods), overruled by United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
317 See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 3 Stat. 191–94 (incorporating the Bank of the United
States and promising not to incorporate another for twenty years).
318 See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (repealed 1809).
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But it also limits their constraining effect. A judicial power that can
apply legal rules without regard to their content must take those
legal rules—for example, those that set out rights and privileges—
as it finds them.
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